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Abstract 
This study evaluates the US Army’s policy on granting moral conduct waivers 
and the effects of moral conduct waivers on the quality of service.  The analysis 
investigates the wartime levels of recruits who were approved for different categories 
of conduct waivers.  The research methodology includes multivariate analyses in the 
form of ordinary least squares regression models and probit regression models.  
This study employs US Army MEPCOM data obtained from the Defense Manpower 
Data Center (DMDC) for soldiers who enlisted between 2000 and 2006.  The study 
will analyze first-term attrition as a function of age, sex, race, AFQT, rank, bonus 
size, education, prior service, youth program participation (such as JROTC), contract 
length, and all sub-categories of conduct waivers. In addition, I analyze attrition at 
180 and 365 days for all cohorts. The study also includes a survival analysis to 
investigate whether conduct waivers affect the duration of survival during the first 
enlistment contract. 
The analysis reveals that attrition rate differences between soldiers with 
waivers and those without does not remain constant and depends on when attrition 
is measured. At the beginning of the first term, conduct waiver soldiers attrite at 
lower rates than non-waiver soldiers. However, at the end of the first term this 
pattern is reversed. Model results show that recruits in the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) sample did not have a large difference in attrition rates between the waiver 
and non-waiver groups by the end of the first term of service.  By breaking down the 
conduct waivers into sub-categories of waivers (substance, serious, and traffic), I 
find that there are significant differences between each groups’ attrition rates. These 
findings raise the question of whether the conduct waiver policy needs to be revised 
to better suit current wartime needs and demographic changes in the recruit 
population.  
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Attrition is costly for the military.  When a soldier does not complete his or her 
initial contract, there are large monetary costs imposed on the Army, including 
recruiting, training, and assignment costs.  Attrition is also one of the few measures 
of quality in the force.  Decreasing attrition is viewed as a cost-saving and quality-
increasing trend.  Over the last five years, the US Army has been under 
considerable strain to make yearly targeted recruiting numbers.  These elevated 
recruitment expectations are predicted to continue far into the future.  As the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan become increasingly unpopular, the challenges in 
recruitment are becoming unprecedented in America.  This difficultly to recruit has 
put the All Volunteer Force under strain not seen since the period just following the 
end of the draft.  In fiscal year (FY) 2007 alone, 80,000 new recruits were needed to 
continue current manning levels and to grow the force to the future goal of 547,000 
soldiers.   
When considering an applicant for enlistment, recruiters have many indicators 
with which to calculate the odds of a recruit surviving the initial term of service.  
Recruiters can examine the applicant’s AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) 
scores, High School performance records, age, marital status and criminal history.  
When considering criminal history, the recruiter reviews the applicant’s prior legal 
history.  The recruit is questioned about any criminal behavior or history of 
drug/alcohol abuse and asked to describe any encounters with law enforcement 
personnel.  From there, a criminal history background check is conducted at the city, 
state, and county levels for each area in which that individual has lived.  If a moral 
conduct waiver is deemed necessary for admission, the category of the past offense 
is determined and a moral conduct waiver packet is submitted to the highest level 
needed to approve the waiver.  The biggest shortcoming of the conduct waiver 
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ability to hide some of their past moral transgressions by either not self-reporting 
criminal history or lying about previous events and habits.  However, they may not 
have an incentive to do so, since penalties for lying or omitting conduct waiver 
issues at the time of enlistment can range from punishment under the UCMJ (Unified 
Code of Military Justice) to a dishonorable discharge under the charge of fraudulent 
enlistment.   
Questions have arisen in the public and military sectors as to whether soldiers 
who require a conduct waiver are diminishing the quality of the force and putting 
strategic and tactical goals in jeopardy.  In The Army Times, Michelle Tan (2007, 
September 3) asserted, “[i]t is sort of like putting bad gas in your gas tank, it is 
probably cheaper … But after a while you will have to change your engine” (p. 14).  
Rep. Marty Mehan, D—Mass, said in an online CBS News article, “The data is clear.  
Our forces are under incredible strain and the only way that they can fill their 
recruiting quotas is by lowering standards” (CBS, 2007, February 14, p. 1).  In 
civilian and military environments, conduct waivers are currently seen as generally 
unfavorable exceptions that must be tolerated when the recruiting situation gets 
difficult.  The questions that follows, then, are the following: Should the Army 
continue to make use of conduct waivers?  And if so, at what cost?  
B. Background 
Increasing the number of recruits the Army brings in each year has had a 
natural effect of increasing the raw number of conduct waiver recruits.  However, the 
increase in conduct wavers is not simply a scale effect. The proportion of recruits 
that require a conduct waiver has also increased, most likely in order to accomplish 
the increasingly difficult manpower goals.  The Army has had to accept more 
soldiers than ever who possess a history of criminal activity or morally questionable 
behavior.  When potential recruits have previous legal violations, they are required to 
disclose their past and have it reviewed by the Army. If the Army deems an 
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improprieties and is allowed entrance into the US Army.  It will not be addressed in 
this paper if this method of identifying questionable behavior is the best means of 
capturing all those who would possibly need this waiver. It is understood that some 
recruits “leak” into military service without identifying some behavior—who (if all 
facts were known) would require a waiver under current Army policy. But, because 
the Army’s methodology of identifying those in need of waivers has not changed, it is 
accepted that the percentage of “leakage” is no greater than at other points of the 
Army’s historical recruiting effort.  Improvements, such as computerized checking of 
legal backgrounds, has only served to help reduce this leakage and increase the 
number of reportable moral waiver recruits.  As a result, the investigation of 
differences in attrition rates between recruits requiring a conduct waiver and those 
who do not, can be made more precise with recent data.  All of the US military 
services assign conduct waivers in a similar manner and are at equal risk to this type 
of problem.   
Recent manpower shortages have required the Army to accept more conduct 
waivers in order to achieve their yearly recruiting goals.  In FY 2003, the US Army 
brought in 4,918 soldiers who needed a conduct waiver (6.8% of all recruits).  That 
number increased over the next few years to 8,129 in FY 2006 (10.2% of all 
recruits).  Such a large increase of so called “criminal recruits” raised eyebrows and 
has worried policy makers about the quality of the force.  The fact that the Army 
needed around 10% of its new recruits to come from this morally questionable 
source highlights the challenges the All Volunteer Force faces with recruiting while 
fighting a war on terror. This issue has received significant attention from the media 
and research arenas.  Over 23,000 recruits have been brought in under a conduct 
waiver in the last four years (7.6% of all recruits). 
The discussion so far has not distinguished between the various types of 
conduct waivers. In fact, there are six types of waivers that depend on the type of 
offense the individual committed before applying to the Army. These include: 
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substance-abuse offenses.  These different waiver categories are also given 
different levels of authorization before being wavered.  Army Regulation 601-210, 
the regulation governing recruiting, treats these types of convictions differently and 
assigns waiver authority according to the category of offense.  The approval 
authority ranges from the local MEPCOM Lieutenant Colonel for minor traffic 
offenses to a Major General for felony and some serious non-traffic waivers.  
According to AR 601-210, waiver authorities are directed by regulation to take into 
account the nature of the offense and to use the “whole person” approach 
(Department of the Army, 2005, May 16, p. 30). Specifically, “the burden is on the 
applicant to prove to waiver authorities that he or she has overcome their 
disqualifications for enlistment and that their acceptance would be in the best 
interest of the Army” (p. 30).  A waiver can be denied by any of the commanders 
below the highest approval authority.  It is believed that potential recruits who can 
prove they have put in the hard work to overcome their moral history will actually 
turn out to be of a higher quality.  By erring on the side of caution in this manner, 
decision-makers attempt to ensure that only applicants who have changed their 
ways and are truly qualified for service are allowed into the US Army.  Risk is, of 
course, assumed with this type of policy; but the costs of denying entrance to this 
10% of recruits and, thus, not making manning goals is much more costly. 
C. Objectives and Scope 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the correlation between a recruit’s 
conduct waiver status and his or her likelihood of attrition from the US Army.  It is 
hypothesized that effects of needing a conduct waiver for entrance to the US Army 
on quality of recruits and attrition no longer fit historical trends due to wartime 
circumstances.  It is also hypothesized that recruits with some types of conduct 
waivers are no more likely to be prematurely discharged than those who did not 
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Currently, the US Army is undergoing a change of terminology used in the 
description of these moral conduct waivers.  The older term of “moral waiver” is 
being replaced with “conduct waiver” (Bland, William S. LTC.  Personal 
Communication, March 18, 2008).  This study attempts to adhere to this newer 
terminology, but it is understood that the two terms can still be used interchangeably 
and are used to describe the same type of enlistment waiver.  Additionally data 
variables in the results section were supplied with the moral waiver headings, so 
much of the data analysis will use the older moral waiver term. 
This analysis examines all US Army recruits who entered between the years 
2000 and 2006.  This study will examine the effects and draw conclusions from first-
term attrition, 365-day attrition and 180-day attrition.  This thesis also aims to answer 
the following questions: what other demographic variables contribute to high attrition 
rates, and are there any factors that mitigate or exacerbate the effect of a conduct 
waiver?  Does entrance with a certain type of conduct waiver carry a higher 
probability of attrition for the same type of moral infraction?  Does a high score on 
the AFQT mitigate the effects of attrition for conduct waiver recruits?   
Through analysis and conclusions from these data sets, I expect to reveal 
new evidence and insights into the conduct waiver policy.  
D. Summary of Chapters 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  Chapter II gives background 
information of literature concerning conduct waivers and attrition in the military.  
Chapter III introduces the data and reveals information that the summary statistics 
hold. The methodology used in the study will be discussed in Chapter III as well.  
Chapter IV then details the study results.  Chapter V provides a summary of the 
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II. Literature Review 
The US Army and the other US military services wish to gain the most highly-
qualified individuals as recruits.  It is believed that recruits of the highest quality will 
perform better in all performance measurements and, in turn, will come at the most 
economical cost to the military.  This is a difficult task to accomplish because high-
quality recruits have more outside opportunities.  A recruit’s potential quality can be 
a difficult characteristic to measure.  Over the history of the All Volunteer Force, 
researchers and the military have used a recruit’s completion of initial obligated term 
of service as a determining factor for whether that recruit was worth the costs of 
recruiting and training.  Performance in the first term of service is not considered 
competitive and performance measures are difficult to quantify.  The completion of a 
recruit’s first term of obligated service is described and known as attrition. Because 
attrition is costly, recruit quality has come to represent the likelihood that the recruit 
will complete the first term of enlistment.  Attrition of recruits can be measured, 
analyzed, and quantified.  Work in this area has produced findings that have 
historically cast a negative light on the practice of conduct waivers.  But, more recent 
work indicates that the negative influence of conduct waivers on attrition has been 
decreasing during wartime.  
Starting in 1996, Eli Flyer conducted groundbreaking research on the issue of 
moral conduct waivers using data on male recruits from California, enlisting during 
FY1985 through FY1989.  He researched the relationship between pre-service 
arrests and attrition, using state records for undisclosed information and enlistment 
files regarding arrests, other quality measures and unsuitability attrition records.  His 
findings cast an early disparity on the use of conduct waivers and questioned the 
wisdom of recruiting a person with a morally questionable past:   
Educational level and AFQT scores have historically been the two most 
important correlates of separation for unsuitability, and, accordingly, are both 
prominent factors in recruit selection. They are also considered important in 
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year to year are considered newsworthy. It is now quite clear that another 
important factor associated with recruit quality has been identified—arrest 
history. This factor is highly related to behavior during military service and 
sufficiently independent of educational level and AFQT score that it should be 
taken into account in its own right. (Flyer, 1996, March, p. 12)  
Flyer’s research included historical criminal records that the Army did not 
have access to. These records were not discovered by the Army due to either the 
recruits not self-reporting their backgrounds or background checks failed to capture 
all of the recruits past criminal history.  At the time, there were large-scale faults in 
the criminal history checking that resulted in some recruits’ criminal records not 
being disclosed. This increased the effect that a criminal history may have caused 
on attrition. Flyer felt:  
The costs to the Military Services in enlisting recruits with an arrest history are 
high. The increased turbulence associated with high unsuitability separation 
rates can only have a marked impact on readiness. Lost training costs and 
increased disciplinary problems add to the problem. There is little question 
that the high unsuitability separation rates experienced by the Military 
Services are driven to a considerable extent by their intake of recruits with an 
arrest history. (p. 13)   
The biggest shortcoming of Flyer’s results is that they were based on 
comparing raw percent distributions between the waiver and non-waiver groups.  
These descriptive statistics shed some light on the problem but leave many 
questions unanswered.  This type of analysis singles out the number of recruits who 
did not complete their first obligation out of the population.  By comparing the 
different percentages and then calculating their percent difference, he calculated that 
a conduct waiver recruit had a 70% higher chance of attrition than a non-waivered 
recruit.  The use of this type of comparative statistics inflated the feel of the effect 
and ignored the interactions of other possible variables that may have explained the 
attrition.  To the untrained eye, a 70% increase gives a sense that waivers contribute 
a stronger effect than they may actually do.  Flyer did give credit to the large 
quantities of recruits who had a conduct waiver and finished their initial obligation; 
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to screen out the high-risk recruits.  In addition, he recommended that the services 
should specifically focus on improving identification of recruits with an arrest history. 
Connor (1997, March) reviewed the use of moral conduct waivers and 
suggested that “[p]roper screening of recruits to identify individuals most likely to 
succeed in the military is imperative to maintain a high quality force” (p. 1).  Connor 
used a binary logistic model to derive his findings on conduct waiver use.  He 
included variables such as race, age, AFQT, and education to explain the effects on 
attrition.  He only included three types of waiver status as explanatory variables.  
These included no prior criminal history, non-felony criminal history, and felony 
criminal history.  This is in contrast to how the military categorizes conduct waivers—
by grouping the effects of different types of conduct waivers together.  His 
categorization gives a close estimate of the conduct waiver effects, but the predicted 
effects will not be as accurate for Army use as if the groups had matched the Army’s 
system.  Connor’s logistic model produced probabilities for attrition of each of his 
conduct waiver groups for each of the AFQT categories and high school diploma 
status.  The data revealed higher attrition probabilities for conduct waivers across all 
ranges of diploma status and AFQT scores. Connor finds that the difference in 
probability of attrition between a recruit with an adult felony conviction compared to a 
recruit without a history of criminal behavior increases consistently from 12.4 
percentage points to 18.4 percentage points depending on AFQT category.  He also 
explains that first-term unsuitability attrition may be improved by identifying and 
decreasing enlistment to individuals based on their criminal background.  Connor did 
not calculate percentage change differences, but rather reported the percentage 
point difference numbering attrition rates.  This technique helped to not inflate the 
effect and allowed readers to determine the severity of the effect on their own.  
Connor recommended screening recruits with felony waivers to improve attrition and 
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Many of the studies in this era center on “unsuitability” attrition, which focuses 
on the conditions of how the soldier was discharged.  This type of study gives a 
much more accurate look at a cause-and-effect-type relationship of needing a 
conduct waiver for entrance, but tends to lean away from the original argument that 
conduct waivers cause more attrition overall and reduce the quality of the force.  If 
attrition is of concern, then it is important to consider the fact that the soldier did not 
make it through the first enlistment for any reason rather than the cause for 
discharge.  Each discharge costs the same in recruitment and training dollars, 
regardless of its nature. 
Later research provided more in-depth analysis to examine the problematic 
nature of conduct waiver use.  To gain a more accurate understanding of the 
conduct waiver attrition problem, researchers began to separate different types of 
conduct waivers and investigate the effects that different pre-service offences had 
on attrition.  For example, Frabutt (1996, March) separated felony and misdemeanor 
crimes.  His analysis included a logistic regression model that predicted the 
probability of a recruit with such a waiver not completing an initial term of service. 
His data came from a sample of California enlistees with known criminal histories.  
His logit results show that California enlistees with a felony waiver are 20 percentage 
points more likely to receive an unsuitability discharge than those with no arrest 
history.  Additionally, the study finds that enlistees in the sample with a 
misdemeanor or lesser charge are 10% more likely to receive an unsuitability 
discharge than are those with no arrest history (1996).  In part due to these findings, 
other researchers began separating recruits by the severity of the conduct leading to 
a waiver.   
Bohn and Schmitz (1996, June) estimated attrition rates  for Navy recruits as 
a function of demographic variables, such as age, race, sex, education, number of 
dependents, and the full spectrum of the AFQT categories.  They analyzed 20% of 
the FY1992-93 Navy accessions in their sample.  The conduct waiver categories 
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included waivers that were granted for criminal and non-criminal pre-service 
offenses.  Given the comprehensive set of controls, these models yielded better 
predictive results for the behavior of recruits who join active-duty service with a 
waiver.  Their data suggests that the effect of conduct waivers on first-term attrition 
may not be as great as predicted in previous research.  They found that recruits with 
waivers for criminal behavior had 5% higher attrition (over two years) than those 
without.  However, the authors also found that the attrition rates of those receiving 
non-criminal, drug or alcohol abuse conduct waivers were not significantly different 
than those without waivers.  They concluded that the current waiver policies may be 
adequate for recruits requiring waivers for minor infractions. The authors also 
suggested that the Flyer’s estimates of the attrition rates of those with criminal 
waivers may have been overestimated.  Additionally, they concluded that attrition 
rates may indeed decline if recruits requiring a waiver are not allowed to join. 
However, in their estimates, the savings would far outweigh the costs of recruiting 
additional qualified applicants.  This study began to shift some of the negative views 
on conduct waivers and opened the door for further research in the area.  The issue 
seemed to be at a standstill—due to low numbers of conduct waivers being issued 
per year and the services’ ability to handle both the costs of recruiting fewer conduct 
waiver recruits and the cost incurred by the policy decision.  This temporary lull in 
the argument would soon be over as the events of the 9/11/2001 terror attacks 
placed the military in a situation of increased recruitment demand. 
With the onset of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), there has been a new 
emphasis on recruit quality.  The increased demand for recruits and the certainty of 
combat-zone tours have limited the availability of high-quality recruits and have 
forced the services to re-evaluate their minimum entry requirements to maintain 
manpower levels.  The arguments of conduct waivers once again arose, and 
research soon followed.  Putka, Noble, Becker, and Ramsberger (2004) examined 
recruit data from 2001.  This study surveyed all four military services and included 
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established a model that contained very detailed variables of conduct waivers, 
gender, race/ethnicity, AFQT category, education amount and quality, marital status, 
and body mass index. Their logistic models produced the odds of attrition in the first 
18 months.  This 18-month time period attempted to capture the recruits that caused 
the greatest expenditure in dollars and produced the least in regards to return on 
investment.  During the first 18 months, the military invests heavily in training and 
recruitment, but the soldiers are not producing much, given that most of their time is 
spent in training. The study reported separate results for the different services.  This 
study yielded results that have a much more direct relationship to this research on 
Army personnel than do others in the field.  After controlling for all demographic 
variables, the authors suggested several changes to the way the Army grants 
conduct waivers.  Putka et al. suggested that the Army consider lowering thresholds 
that trigger waivers for both minor non-traffic violations and serious non-traffic 
violations.  By contrast, they suggest raising the standards of selection criteria 
(AFQT and education credential) for two or more minor non-traffic violations, minor 
non-traffic violations committed before the age of age 14, serious non-traffic 
violations, felonies, positive pre-entry drug tests, and three or more self-reported 
marijuana uses.  Through these changes, the researchers expected the Army to 
decrease attrition and reduce costs, although, increased recruiting costs were not 
considered. Putka et al. expanded this research by analyzing repeat behaviors of 
criminal activity.  They found that some types of conduct waivers yielded higher 
attrition related to moral character.  This means that conduct waiver recruits were 
not completing their first 18 months due to problems that were closely related to 
activities that triggered a waiver. The authors observed that individuals with conduct 
waivers for non-traffic, adult felonies, marijuana use, positive drug or alcohol tests, 
or multiple waivers, were significantly more likely to attrite for reasons directly related 
to such behavioral problems than individuals without waivers (p. 32).  The sample 
used in this study was broad across the services, but it only included a snapshot of 
one cohort. The data did not capture soldiers who enlisted after the tragic terrorist 
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the attrition rates of recruits with conduct waivers, or potential changes in these 
trends during war times.  
Putka and Strickland (2005) followed up with another study including data 
from US Army soldiers who had served during the GWOT and had joined after 
9/11/2001.  The FY 2003 recruit sample was used and compared to results gained 
from the pre-GWOT FY 1999 recruit sample.  This time, the effects of the GWOT on 
conduct waiver recruits began to emerge in the data: 
With regard to the moral character waivers, Soldiers with such waivers in the 
FY 03 cohort were 2.25 times less likely to attrite in BCT (Basic Combat 
Training) than Soldiers without such waivers.  Whereas in the FY 99 cohort, 
Soldiers with moral character waivers were only 1.05 times less likely to attrite 
in BCT than Soldiers without such waivers. (Putka & Strickland, 2005, 
September, p. 26)  
Putka and Strickland reported odds ratios to quantify differences in attrition 
rates. They also did not separate conduct waivers into categories based on the 
severity of the problem. In these samples, solders who enlisted with conduct waivers 
performed slightly better than their non-waiver counterparts.  These findings were 
directly opposed to their earlier results and all prior studies on this topic. This 
contrast reveals that how conduct waivers are used to fill manning needs may be 
different during times of war.  Given the time of the study, the authors could not 
observe recruits for a long period of time. Therefore, their attrition results refer to 
BCT attrition.  Putka and Strickland admitted that that these results may be due to 
immaturity of the sample, and that over time, different characteristics may affect 
attrition at different rates.  
Studies over the last 20 years have varied in their findings of the effect of 
conduct waivers on the quality of the force. Earlier findings suggested that such 
waivers are inadequate manning tools that facilitate meeting recruiting goals in the 
short run at the cost of higher attrition in the long run. More recent studies indicate 
that under certain circumstances, conduct waivers may actually bring in the type of 
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results are driven from the use of different control and treatment groups, the time at 
which attrition was measured, cohort years studied, and potentially self-selection 
bias.  There does seem to be a trend over time that at least attempts to separate the 
effect of the different types of waivers and to gain knowledge about specific groups 
rather than lumping different types of waivered individuals together.  However, these 
waivers will continue to be a point of contention as the demand for new recruits 
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III. Data and Methodology 
A. Data Description 
Data for this study were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC).  These data were primarily derived from United States Military Entrance 
Processing Command (MEPCOM) enlisted personnel data files of new US Army 
recruits.  This data file provides an initial snapshot of each individual’s data collected 
during initial processing at recruitment centers and military entrance processing 
centers.  For those who separate, the data set includes information concerning the 
discharge status and discharge date.  The data set consists of all enlisted 
accessions between fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2006.  The data set contains 
520,972 individual records and tracks them through the use of a sequentially 
assigned individual identification number. 
The sample was restricted to soldiers who signed 3- or 4-year contracts. 
Limiting the sample this way, allows for both holding constant the length of the initial 
obligation, and also provides enough time for recruits to mature through time and 
have an equal opportunity to attrite.  Recruits of normal enlistment age (17 to 42) 
were kept in the sample while individuals outside that range were dropped.  It is 
believed that anyone outside that range had either errors in reporting or enlisted 
under mitigating circumstances which would bias their attrition measurements. 
Finally, anyone who came in above the rank of E-4 was dropped from the sample.  
This was done primarily to sharpen the focus of the study and to ensure accurate 
results, by removing enlistees who are very different from the average recruit. 
Finally, individuals with missing, or clearly erroneous information were also removed. 
These restrictions reduced the sample size to 404,646 observations.  Table 1 
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Table 1.   Details of Individuals Removed from Sample 
Reason for dropping Number removed Explanation 
 Contract Length 102,048 
Restricted sample to only 3- and 
4- years contracts. 
 Rank at Time of Entry 7,539 
Restricted sample to ranks E-1 to 
E-4 
 Age Greater Than 42 6,739 
Removed individuals outside the 
standard enlistment age. 
Total Removed From 
Sample 116,326   
 
B. Key Variables 
From the original data set, 14 characteristics were identified as most 
important, and variables were generated to capture their effects on first-term attrition 
at various times.  The choice of these variables was based on the literature reviewed 
earlier, indicating that they are contributing factors to attrition; they are also the 
factors that are considered by commanders when a moral waiver is issued.  Table 2 
contains a list of all variables used and their description.  
Below is a review of the independent variables used in the models and the 
expected effect of each variable on the dependent (attrition) variables. 
1. Gender.  The Male dummy variable takes a value of 1 for males and 0 
for females.  I expect this variable to capture the gender difference in attrition.  
Historically, females have shown higher attrition rates than males. A literature review 
conducted by the US Army center for health promotion and preventative medicine on 
attrition found that women are more likely to leave the service early than men.  
Female attrition rates are 1.1 to 1.8 times higher than those of males, depending on 
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2. Age.  For this variable, a continuous measurement of age was used.  
Recruits above the age of 42 or below the age of 17 were dropped from the sample.  
I hypothesize that recruits’ ages will have a significant effect on their attrition rates.  
Younger recruits may be more physically capable of service, but older recruits are 
expected to show better decision-making and to have increased chances of 
completing the first term of service.  Age squared was also included to capture any 
non-linear effects of age on attrition.  I expect this variable to refine the picture of 
how age affects attrition.  The older age groups should have more negative effects 
on attrition than the younger groups when measuring long-term attrition, but may 
show poorer attrition when analyzing short-term attrition.  
3. Race/Ethnicity.  This information was captured by a series of dummy 
variables (White, Black, Hispanic, and Other) indicating the race of the recruit.  
Prior research in this area has shown varying results for the effect of race on 
attrition. It is of interest to investigate whether the percentage of moral waivers 
varies by race and/or over time. 
4. Ability.  The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score will be 
used as a proxy for the ability of the recruit. The AFQT variable represents the 
soldier’s raw score from this test.  Prior studies have found that this variable is 
inversely related to attrition.  It is unclear, however, how ability interacts with a moral 
waiver. If soldiers have high ability, they may complete their initial contracts despite 
having a criminal history. 
5. Education.  The NHSDG variable takes a value of 1 if the soldier 
dropped out of high school or did not receive a traditional high school diploma (this 
includes GED-recipients and those who obtained other forms of high school 
accreditation).  Soldiers who received a high school diploma or obtained additional 
years of education (which range from some college to advanced degrees), receive a 
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school graduates will have higher attrition rates; therefore this variable will have a 
positive effect on the attrition variables. 
6. Youth Programs.  These variables represent participation in various 
military-related youth or high school programs prior to enlistment.  YP includes 
programs such as civil air patrol and sea cadets.  JROTC defines participation in 
Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps, a high school program.  ROTC defines 
participation in Reserve Officer Training Corps, a program that provides scholarships 
while providing military officer training in college.  I assume these programs will have 
a small negative effect on attrition due to the soldiers having some previous 
experience and having shown previous interest in the military.  These variables will 
be set up in dummy format and will take a value of 1 for program participation, and 0 
if the recruits did not report participating in these programs. 
7. Prior Service.  The PS dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the soldier 
has a history of prior service.  These soldiers should know more about the military 
than a non-prior-service individual, thus making them more likely to complete their 
contract. They are probably older and will enter with higher rank.  On the other hand, 
I question under what circumstances they were released from military duty 
previously.  This variable was created in order to separate out these individuals, who 
are believed to be fundamentally different from the rest of the sample. 
8. Marital Status.  The Married dummy variable represents the recruit’s 
marital status at time of entry.  A 1 will represent married while 0 will represent 
single, widowed, divorced, and annulled.  I expect this variable to have a positive 
effect on attrition.  It has been shown that individuals with families have higher 
attrition rates than those without during the first term of enlistment.  Knapik’s 
literature review on attrition studies finds that service members who are married or 
have dependents are more likely to exit the service before completion of their 
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9. Rank.  The Rank variable represents the soldier’s assigned rank at 
entry.  All enlisted grades were assigned a value 1 through 9 but the ranks of E-5 
through E-9 were dropped from the sample because it is believed that they do not 
represent the average recruit and would, therefore, bias the results of the model.  
This variable should show some negative effect on attrition due to rank being 
assigned based on a recruit’s previous achievements and accomplishments, 
assistance in recruitment efforts, as well as other quantifiable positive qualities.  This 
variable will be most helpful in removing soldiers who would cloud the moral waiver 
effects on attrition. 
10. Dependents.  This variable lists the number of dependents a soldier 
claimed at time of entry.  I believe this variable will not have much effect on attrition 
in the short run, but will prove to have a small effect on attrition over the course of 
the first term.  I hypothesize that the increased pressure of supporting an increasing 
number of dependents will limit the soldier’s choice to attrite.     
11. Contract Length.  Both 3- and 4-year contracts were set up here into 
one variable.  The length of contract that was signed by the recruit carried a value of 
either 3 or 4.  I hypothesize that two opposing factors affect this variable’s effect on 
attrition.  I believe that longer contracts are harder to complete and should show 
more attrition; however, longer contracts are often assigned to more training-
intensive Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) that require higher-quality recruits.  
This variable was created in order to help restrict the sample, not to measure the 
effect of these two different contract lengths. 
12. Waivers.   
MORAL_WAIVER.  Dummy variables take a value of 1 for those who need a 
conduct waiver upon enlistment.  Dummy variables were generated based on the 
waiver codes provided in the data set.  The conduct waiver dummy variables 
generated are as follows: MORAL_WAIVER for all combined waivers that qualified 
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all serious traffic waivers, MNT_WAIVER for all minor non-traffic waivers, 
SNT_WAIVER for all serious non-traffic waivers, FEL_WAIVER for all waivers that 
involved a felony conviction, and DRUG_WAIVER for both self-reported and drug 
screening drug use.  For variable creation the original DMDC variable name of 
MORAL_WAIVER will be used and meant to stand for conduct waivers.  Appendix A 
lists each waiver code included in the sample.  Added to that listing is a designation 
as to which waiver group each code was assigned.  I expect that as the severity of 
the prior offense increases, the effect on attrition will become more positive.  This 
means that the more severe crimes should yield poorer attrition outcomes.   
However, these waiver relationships may be greatly affected by the current War on 
Terror and may have effects on attrition not found in prior literature. 
MED_WAIVER.  A dummy variable was inserted here to represent recruits 
who required a medical history waiver to gain enlistment. These waivers are issued 
for pre-existing medical conditions that would normally block an individual from 
enlistment.  Additionally, medical waivers may be assigned for recruits who do not 
meet height and weight requirements. The variable takes a value of 1 if a person 
needs a medical waiver at enlistment.  Historically, soldiers who enlisted with a 
medical waiver showed lower attrition rates.  For this reason, I expect these types of 
waivers will show higher attrition.      
OTHER_WAIVER.  In some cases, recruits need waivers that are not medical 
or conduct related.  These waivers are issued for such things as too many 
dependents, having a military spouse, receiving a low AFQT score, or being a 
conscientious objector. 1  For these types of waivers a dummy variable was created 
and possessing such a waiver was coded as a 1.  I assume these waivers will have 
                                            
1 Other waivers include maximum age limit, military spouse, number of dependants, previous military 
separation, minimum education requirements, sole surviving family member, conscientious objector, 
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a positive effect on attrition due to the fact that they represent something other than 
a non-waivered recruit. 
NO_WAIVER.  For soldiers who needed absolutely no waiver to enlist, a 
dummy variable was created.  For these waivers, a dummy variable was set up and 
assigned a 1.  I hypothesize that this group will have lower attrition rates.  This effect 
should hold constant across all time measurements of attrition.   
13. Year Cohorts.  The in_Year_200X is a dummy variable that indicates 
the year the soldier enlisted.  Fiscal years range from 2000 to 2006.  This variable is 
used to capture any significant cohort differences.   
The following is a description of the dependent variables used in multivariate 
regression models as well as in the survival analysis models.  These variables use 
the inter-service separation codes (as well as actual days served) versus 
contractually obligated days in order to determine attrition and length of time served. 
14. Attrition 
For this study, I have chosen to examine attrition at three different points in 
time:  180-day, 365-day, and first-term attrition. First-term attrition will be confined to 
recruits with 3- and 4-year initial contracts.  The data provided contain information on 
individuals who enlisted for both longer and shorter contracts, but these individuals 
were eliminated due to a lack of time to mature through the sample. These attrition 
variables will be defined by loss codes used by the US Army and dates of service 
provided in the data.  The goal will be to analyze the effect of having a conduct 
waiver at recruitment on each attrition variable.   
Inter-service separation codes were used to determine if a separating soldier 
was counted as an attrition loss or considered a non-attrition loss.  Appendix A 
includes a complete listing of the separation codes contained in the sample and how 
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Attrited under 180.  This is a dummy variable in which 1 represents a soldier 
who did not complete 180 days of active service.  This is believed to be the most 
costly period to the Army due to the high fixed costs for recruitment and training.  I 
expect the first 180 days to be a large portion of the total first-term attrition in both 
the 3- and 4-year contract categories.    
Attrited under 365.  This is a dummy variable in which 1 represents a soldier 
who did not complete one year of active service.  Soldiers who had an entry date 
during FY2006 are not included in this sample and are given a missing value 
because they potentially did not have an opportunity to serve 365 days, since the 
sample was collected before the end of the 2007 fiscal year.  This reduction 
eliminates 62,147entries from the sample.  The Attrited_under_365 models contain 
342,499 observations.  I believe this variable will reflect interesting differences 
between the types of soldiers who attrite early as compared to those who attire later 
in their contract. 
Attrited before contract complete.  This is a dummy variable in which 1 
represents a soldier who did not complete the contracted amount of active service of 
either 3 or 4 years.  Soldiers who had an entry date during fiscal years 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006 are not included in these models because they did not have an 
opportunity to complete their entire 3- or 4-year contract.  This reduction eliminates 
many observations from the model.  Models investigating first-term attrition contain 
170,378 observations. 
Substance Attrition.  This is a dummy variable in which 1 represents a 
soldier attrited for drugs or alcohol reasons. This variable was created to indicate if a 
soldier had been separated with a discharge coded as Alcoholism or Drugs.  This 
variable will beused to investigate whether soldiers who enlist with substance 
waivers are more likely to attrite due to substance abuse. This variable contains 
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Table 2.   Variables’ Names and Definitions 
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Attrited before contract complete 
 = 1 if Received an attrition related discharge before contract completed;    
 = 0 if contract completed 
Attrited under 365 
 = 1 if Received an attrition related discharge before 365 days;   
 = 0 if 365 days completed 
Attrited under 180 
 = 1 if Received an attrition related discharge before 180 days;   
 = 0 if 180 days completed 
Substance Attrition 
 = 1 if Received a substance related attrition discharge;    
 = 0 if did not received a substance related attrition discharge. 
Male  = 1 if Male; = 0 if Female 
Age Age in years; range = (17 to 42) 
Age_sqr Age squared 
White  = 1 if White; = 0 if non-White 
Black  = 1 if Black; = 0 if non-Black 
Hispanic  = 1 if Hispanic; = 0 if non-Hispanic 
Other_race  = 1 if Other race; = 0 if White, Black or Hispanic 
AFQT Armed Forces Qualification Test score: range = (0 to 99) 
NHSDG  = 1 if no high school diploma; = 0 if high school diploma graduate 
YP  = 1 if participated in a Youth Program; = 0 if no participation 
JROTC  = 1 if participated in JROTC; = 0 if no participation 
ROTC  = 1 if participated in ROTC; = 0 if no participation 
Married  = 1if Married;  = 0 if not married 
RANK Enlistment Rank; range = (1 to 4) 
Dependants Number of dependants; range = (0 to 9) 
FY_year Fiscal Year of enlistment; range = (2000 to 2006) 
Contract_length Contract Length; range = (3 to 4) 
MED_WAIVER  = 1 if received a Medical waiver; = 0 if no medical waiver 
MORAL_WAIVER  = 1 if received a Conduct waiver; = 0 if no medical waiver 
MT_WAIVER  = 1 if received a Minor Traffic waiver; = 0 if no Minor Traffic waiver 
ST_WAIVER  = 1 if received a Serious Traffic waiver; = 0 if no Serious Traffic waiver 
MNT_WAIVER 
 = 1 if received a Serious non-Traffic waiver;  
 = 0 if no Serious non-Traffic waiver 
SNT_WAIVER 
 = 1 if received a Minor non-Traffic waiver;  
 = 0 if no Minor non-Traffic waiver 
FEL_WAIVER  = 1 if received a Felony waiver; = 0 if no Felony waiver 
DRUG_WAIVER  = 1 if received a Drug waiver; = 0 if no Drug waiver 
OTHER _WAIVER  = 1 if received a Other type waiver; = 0 if no Other type waiver 
NO_WAIVER 
 = 1 if received No waivers;  
 = 0 if received some type of enlistment waiver 
in_FY_y~2000  = 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2000; = 0 if not in 2000 cohort 
in_FY_y~2001  = 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2001; = 0 if not in 2001 cohort 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v - 24 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE DEFINITION 
in_FY_y~2003  = 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2003; = 0 if not in 2003 cohort 
in_FY_y~2004  = 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2004; = 0 if not in 2004 cohort 
in_FY_y~2005  = 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2005; = 0 if not in 2005 cohort 
in_FY_y~2006  = 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2006; = 0 if not in 2006 cohort 
 
C. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the model variables are listed in Table 3.  This 
table shows the number of observations, the mean of the variable value across all 
observations, the value of one standard deviation, as well as the minimum and 
maximum values.   
Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Male 404,646 0.8199 0.3842 0 1
White 382,422 0.6400 0.4800 0 1
Black 382,422 0.1877 0.3905 0 1
Hispanic 382,422 0.1299 0.3362 0 1
Other_race 382,422 0.0424 0.2016 0 1
Age 404,646 21.0611 3.7936 17 42
Age_sqr 404,646 457.9599 184.7335 289 1,764
White 382,422 0.6400 0.4800 0 1
Afqt 404,646 56.8569 19.5654 0 99
NHSDG 404,646 0.1964 0.3973 0 1
Married 404,646 0.1703 0.3759 0 1
Dependants 403,162 0.3481 0.8388 0 9
YP 404,646 0.0007 0.0261 0 1
J_ROTC 404,646 0.0257 0.1583 0 1
PS 404,646 0.0957 0.2942 0 1
RANK 395,925 1.8757 1.0389 1 4
MORAL_WAIVER 404,646 0.0846 0.2782 0 1
MED_WAIVER 404,646 0.0569 0.2316 0 1
OTHER_WAIVER 404,646 0.0303 0.1715 0 1
Attrited_before 180 342499 0.1155 0.3196 0 1
Attrited_before 365 342499 0.1596 0.3662 0 1
Attrited_before 1st term 170378 0.3348 0.4719 0 1
FY2000 404,646 0.1323 0.3388 0 1
FY2001 404,646 0.1441 0.3512 0 1
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FY2003 404,646 0.1375 0.3443 0 1
FY2004 404,646 0.1526 0.3596 0 1
FY2005 404,646 0.1352 0.3420 0 1
FY2006 404,646 0.1536 0.3605 0 1
 
Table 3 indicates that the dependent variables assume historically known 
ranges.  In some cases the number of observations listed change for a given 
variable. This is due to missing values for that variable.  In addition, the various 
attrition variables contain different observation numbers.  In both the 180- and 365-
day attrition, there are 342,499 observations. Yet, in contract-complete attrition, 
there are only 170,378 observations. This is because many of the individuals did not 
have an opportunity to mature through the sample timeline to reach their end-of-
contract, but they did pass the 1-year point.   
Values for race/ethnicity show different numbers of observations.  This is due 
to structural errors in the encoding of Hispanic, so this ethnicity code could be 
generated into a race/ethnicity tracking variable.  Some individuals showed either 
positive or missing values for both categories and could not be determined as to 
which racial/ethnic group they best fit.  In these cases the individuals were given a 
missing value for race/ethnicity and will be left out of the models using those race 
codes.     
Also listed in Table 3 are the mean values for each variable.  About 82% of 
the sample is male, 64% is white, 19% is African American, and 13% is Hispanic. 
The average AFQT score of the sample is 64 and 19.6% of the sample does not 
have a traditional high school diploma.   
Next I will focus on conduct waivers and the background characteristics of 
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1. General Observations 
After reducing the sample to only include soldiers who were contracted for 3- 
and 4-year enlistments, 393,180 individuals remained in the sample.  Of those, 
32,934 or 8.38% received a conduct waiver prior to enlistment. Table 4 details the 
number and percentages of each type of conduct waiver issued.  In fiscal year 2000, 
only 5.38% of newly enlisted recruits had a conduct waiver. In 2006 this percentage 
had grown to 12.36%. (Figure 1).  This corresponds to previous studies, which have 
found that the use of conduct waivers has increased since the onset of the War on 
Terror. 
Table 4.   Conduct Waiver Percentages for Fiscal Years 2000 through 20062 
  Number % of sample % of conduct waivers
Total 404,646 100.00% N/A
No Conduct Waiver 370,432 91.54% N/A
Conduct Waiver 34,214 8.46% 100.00%
Minor Traffic (MT) 112 0.03% 0.33%
Serious Traffic (ST) 2,096 0.57% 6.13%
Minor Non-Traffic (MNT) 1,089 0.29% 3.18%
Serious Non-Traffic (SNT) 19,163 5.17% 56.01%
Felony Waiver (FEL) 6,200 1.67% 18.12%
Drug Use Waiver (DRUG) 6,333 1.71% 18.51%
 
 
                                            
2 The different types of waivers do not sum to equal the total number of moral waivers because some 
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Figure 1.   Total and Percentages of Moral Conduct and Medical Waivers Issued 
during Fiscal Years 2000 through 2006 
 
The level of conduct waivers issued seems high initially but it should be 
considered in light of the fact that the Army is facing unprecedented recruitment 
challenges.  The US Army Recruiting Command has been tasked with increasing the 
size of the Army by 8,000 troops a year through FY 2012.  This increased quota—
along with its already high recruitment demand—means that in fiscal year 2008, 
80,000 new soldiers will need to be recruited.  
To analyze 180-day and 365-day attrition, I use data from fiscal years 2000 
through 2005; for 3- and 4-year contract-completion attrition, only fiscal years 2000 
through 2002 could be used.  Table 5 shows the different attrition percentages for 
the conduct waiver group and no waiver group.3  In bold are the groups who 
experienced the lowest attrition rates.  Across all years, soldiers who entered with a 
conduct waiver had consistently lower attrition rates through the initial 180 days and 
first year of enlistment.  This effect could be due to the “whole person” policy, which 
                                            
3 For this comparison, the soldiers with moral waivers who also needed a medical waiver to enlist 
were removed to ensure interactions between the two variables were not to interfere with the pure 
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requires individuals with waivers to have better education, AFQT scores, or other 
characteristics that would counterbalance the waiver. The early lower attrition rates 
could also be due to increased monitoring of behavior and restricted privileges in 
both basic training and advanced individual training.  By the end of the first term, 
however, soldiers without a conduct waiver have lower attrition rates.  Table 5 
indicates that those without conduct waivers have achieved a lower attrition 
percentage than their peers.  This reversed effect now puts those without a conduct 
waiver at roughly a 4 percentage point lower lower attrition rate by the end of the first 
term. This equates to a 12.5% difference between the two groups.  However, the 
magnitude of attrition rates between the two groups is now far below the percentage 
levels found in prior studies by Connor, Flyer, or Frabutt.  Furthermore these 
percentage differences in rates are based on a small, but increasing, number of 
individuals when taking into account the sample size per year of the conduct waiver 
group.  
Table 5 also indicates that the 6-month and 1-year attrition rates have 
increased slightly over time since 2000, possibly due to the Global War on Terror.  
This effect spans across both those with and without a conduct waiver. 
Table 5.   180-day, 1-year, and Full-term Attrition Percentages of Soldiers with and 
without Moral Waivers 
  180-day attrition  365-day attrition  First term attrition 
Fiscal 













2000   8.49 10.73  12.14 14.38  38.41 33.09 
2001   9.23 11.66  13.5 15.53  38.18 34.24 
2002   9.69 11.12  14.64 15.59  36.49 32.23 
2003   10.02 11.27  15.1 16.27      
2004   11.96 14.19  16.97 18.85      
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Table 6 compares the background characteristics of recruits with conduct or 
medical waivers to those with no waivers.  Since differences in means may appear 
large for variables with a large variance, I also present standardized differences 
between both groups. These are calculated as: d = (M1 - M2)/ σ.  These standardized 
differences illustrate the significance of the differences between the groups. 
Differences in means that exceed a quarter of a standard deviation will be 
interpreted as significantly large. Table 6 shows that 92% of those with conduct 
waivers were male and 81% of non-waivered solders were male. With a 
standardized difference of more than a quarter of a standard deviation between the 
two groups, it can be seen that they are significantly different in their gender 
composition. It is also important to note that those with conduct waivers are also on 
average 1.4 years older than the no-waiver group.  The same goes for those with 
medical waivers. As far as ability, soldiers with both conduct and medical waivers 
appear to score slightly higher in the AFQT test that those with no waivers. While 
this indicates in part that the “whole person” policy is being followed, the difference 
in AFQT scores is insignificant at only 12% of a standard deviation.  Interestingly, 
those with conduct waivers appear to be less likely to have obtained a traditional 
high school diploma. About 26% of those with conduct waivers do not have a high 
school diploma, versus 19% of those without waivers and the 17% of those with 
medical waivers.  Some individuals may also possess waivers categorized as other-
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Table 6.   Background Characteristics of Recruits by Waiver Type 
Variables  Moral Waivers STD DIFF No Waiver STD DIFF Med Waivers STD DIFF 
    Moral vs No   Med vs No   Moral vs Med 
Male 0.92 0.29 0.81 0.06 0.83 0.23
White 0.74 0.24 0.63 0.17 0.71 0.07
Black 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.11 0.15 0.05
Hispanic 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.00
Other race 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06
Age 22.14 0.37 20.73 0.30 21.87 0.07
AFQT 58.76 0.12 56.44 0.15 59.35 0.03
NHSDG 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.06 0.17 0.24
Married 0.18 0.05 0.16 0.09 0.19 0.04
Dependents 0.39 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.40 0.01
YP 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03
J_ROTC 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05
PS 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.22
RANK 1.69 0.16 1.86 0.10 1.96 0.26
Moral Waiver 1.00  0.00  0.07   
Med Waiver 0.05  0.00  1.00   
Other Waiver 0.02  0.00  0.05   
180-day Attrition 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.13 0.11
365-day Attrition 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.17 0.08
Full-term Attrition 0.37 0.09 0.33 0.02 0.34 0.07
 
These findings indicate that there are systematic differences between these 
groups. Therefore, comparing raw attrition rates may yield misleading results.   
2. Race/Ethnicity 
In this section, I investigate further differences in conduct waivers by race 
category. One caveat is in order: the coding of the race and ethnicity variables 
changed in 2002 to include previously omitted races and ethnicities.  This was a 
direct attempt to more accurately capture a soldier’s true racial and ethnic 
background.  Despite code changes in this sample, all who remained as viable in the 
sample possessed enough information to be included in one of the four 
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Table 7 presents the incidence of waivers by racial category and by fiscal 
year.  It appears that whites possessed on average more waivers than non-whites 
throughout the years of the sample.  Over the 6 years examined, an average of 
9.96% of whites needed a conduct waiver to enlist, whereas only 6.26% of non-white 
recruits required such a waiver.  Over the same period of time, there was an 
increase in the number of white recruits.  This amplified the effect, making the 
numbers of individuals with conduct waivers in that group appear (to a certain 
extent) larger.  As illustrated in Table 7, through all years in the sample, whites carry 
a higher percentage of conduct waivers than non-whites.  Bohn (1996) also noted 
that the race and ethnicity of Navy enlistees affected waiver probabilities (p. 4-5). 
Even though his data referred to a 1992-1993 sample.  This parallel indicates that 
the Army may not have increased its waiver percentages much differently from other 
services in the past.  The proportion of the sample with waivers has increased 
evenly across all four race/ethnic groups over the years observed.  All groups seem 
to nearly double the number of conduct waivers between 2000 and 2006. 
Table 7 includes medical waiver percentages across years as well.  All racial 
groups also see an increase in medical waivers during the same time period, but 
they do not experience the drastic increase evident in the conduct waiver data.  This 
is expected, since it is far more probable that a recruit could be enlisted with a 
serious criminal history than for a serious medical condition.  Moral problems may be 
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Table 7.   Waiver by Race 
      Fiscal Year               
White 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
No waiver 85.62% 84.58% 81.15% 83.70% 84.24% 79.60% 75.77%
Conduct waiver 6.41% 7.89% 10.71% 9.29% 7.77% 11.01% 14.33%
Medical waiver 5.37% 5.12% 5.28% 5.63% 6.94% 7.65% 7.38%
           
Black 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
No waiver 88.91% 86.93% 86.65% 87.66% 88.50% 85.07% 81.53%
Conduct waiver 3.63% 5.50% 6.75% 5.97% 5.25% 6.71% 8.41%
Medical waiver 4.38% 4.12% 3.83% 4.36% 4.66% 5.67% 5.71%
          
Hispanic 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
No waiver 90.71% 89.14% 88.29% 89.39% 90.27% 85.66% 81.17%
Conduct waiver 3.96% 5.69% 6.35% 5.83% 4.76% 7.14% 9.69%
Medical waiver 3.58% 3.45% 3.50% 3.52% 3.91% 5.65% 6.02%
          
Other Race 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
No waiver 86.80% 88.64% 85.61% 87.31% 88.78% 83.75% 80.71%
Conduct waiver 5.06% 5.40% 6.93% 6.07% 4.48% 6.70% 9.86%
Medical waiver 6.41% 3.99% 5.27% 5.65% 5.82% 7.78% 6.75%
                
 
3. Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) 
The AFQT has been used as a “recruit quality indicator” since 1976 (Fitz & 
McDaniel, 1988, December, p. 13).  Research has consistently shown that recruits 
with higher AFQT scores perform better and are less likely to receive early 
discharges than those with lower scores.  Table 8 displays average AFQT scores by 
waiver status across the years studied.  Recruits with both conduct and medical 
waivers consistently score slightly higher on the AFQT than non-waivered recruits.  
This should be an indicator than conduct and medical waiver soldiers should perform 
at par or even better than those with no waivers and be less likely to attrite.  This 
would seem to indicate that the Army is looking for mitigating factors when enlisting 
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waiver recruits receive should be somewhat diminished.  Indeed, commanders who 
authorize waiver approvals are looking for mitigating factors with which to support 
the award of the waiver; a characteristic such as a high AFQT could definitely be 
such a factor.  This scenario would lead to an overall pattern of granting waivers to 
applicants who are well-suited for success in the Army, thus increasing the AFQT.  
This circumstance would raise the average AFQT score of waivered recruits above 
that of the non-waivered recruits, since applicants are not randomly selected.  This 
actually indicates that the “whole person” policy is being followed and that waivers 
are not just being used as a loophole to increase recruitment.   
Table 8.   AFQT Score by Waiver Category and Year 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Avg. AFQT of non-waivered recruits 55.6 55.6 57.6 55.2 58.3 57.2 55.4 56.4 
Avg. AFQT of Conduct waiver recruits 58.2 58.1 59.9 57.0 60.4 60.0 57.9 58.8 
Avg. AFQT of Medical waiver recruits 58.5 58.0 59.5 57.3 61.4 60.7 58.9 59.3 
 
4. High School Diploma Status 
Completion of a high school diploma has long been used as a predictor of 
successful completion of the first-term enlistment.  Many studies have often 
highlighted this factor as a pivotal variable in decreasing attrition.  Over the years 
examined in this study, the annual number of Non-High School Diploma Graduates 
(NHSDG) increased from 7,462 to 18,626.  This increase is more likely a stronger 
influence on attrition than the increase in conduct waivers alone.  Recruits with 
conduct waivers, however, are less likely to have a traditional high school diploma 
than recruits without conduct waivers, but this may be due, in part, to the 
proliferation of alternative certifications for high school completion. These would 
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D. Following Information 
This overview of descriptive statistics is followed by a more rigorous 
multivariate analysis and discussion of result.  The chapter concludes with findings 
generated using survival analysis. These are included to help better understand 
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IV. Results 
A. Regression Results 
To investigate the effect of waivers on attrition, I estimate probit models that 
control for most observable background characteristics. Probit models are employed 
because the dependent variables of interest are binary.  In all three attrition models, 
the control group is the same and it includes recruits who join the Army without any 
type of waiver. This no-waiver group requires the individual did not possess a 
conduct, medical or any other type of enlistment waiver. In addition, the base case in 
all models is a white male recruit who is a high school graduate, unmarried, with no 
dependents who did not participate in a youth program or JROTC.   
The first two tables (Tables 9 and 10) compare the model coefficients for both 
a restricted and an unrestricted sample.  The restricted sample includes only those 
cohorts who are observed for the entire length of the first term. The unrestricted 
sample includes everyone. The results for early attrition were estimated using both 
the restricted and unrestricted sample to ensure changes in coefficients’ significance 
and magnitude are actual attrition effects and not merely cohort effects.  The 180- 
and 365-day attrition variable contains 298,444 observations for the unrestricted 
sample, while the full-term attrition variable contains 141,627.  This technique 
controls for individuals who appear in the restricted model to contribute to the 
regression results.  In this method, the same cohort of individuals from the 180- and 
365-day attrition models can later be compared to the full-term attrition 
measurement.  In the first two columns for each sample the models are the same 
except for the variables that control for ability.  These variables are believed to offset 
the effects of having a moral conduct waiver.  By adding these variables separately it 
is possible to see the effects that they have on the moral conduct waiver variable 
coefficients.  In the final column, the moral waiver variable is replaced by the six 
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group.  The final model (Table 11) contains the same variables but the model can 
only be estimated on data for fiscal years 2000-2002. 
Table 9 details the probit regression outputs for the unrestricted and restricted 
sample of 180-day attrition model.  This 180-day model also provides marginal 
probabilities of attrition for each control variable in square brackets.  Listed at the 
bottom of Table 9 is the observed (sample) probability of attrition at 180 days as well 
as the probability of attriting predicted by the model for an individual with average 
continuous characteristics and with base case binary characteristics.  From this, it is 
clear that the model is accurately predicting attrition for both the restricted and 
unrestricted models.  Additionally, we see that the models are once again similar, 
suggesting that cohort effects are not very important.  The predicted attrition rate of 
roughly 12% indicates that the model is performing correctly by accurately reflecting 
attrition rates for this time period as listed in Table 5.  The results in Table 9 indicate 
that the moral waiver variable carries a significant negative sign, suggesting that 
those with conduct waivers are less likely to attrite.  This predicted marginal effect 
indicates that having a conduct waiver decreases the attrition probability by 0.02, or 
17%.4  Column 3 and 6 disaggregate the moral waiver category in separate 
subgroups.  The predicted effect of conduct waivers on 180-day attrition again 
appears to be negative for most subgroups, except minor traffic waivers for which 
the effect is insignificant.  However, the minor traffic waiver category contains only 
112 observations, which could be the reason why the predicted effect appears 
insignificant.  
Comparing the effect of conduct waivers with and without the ability proxies 
indicates that the effect of the waiver increases in magnitude after controlling for 
ability. This is consistent with the hypothesis that recruits with conduct waivers may 
be negatively selected. Controlling for ability reduces even further the attrition rates 
                                            
4 Calculated as the ratio of the marginal effect over the observed probability of attrition 
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of recruits with conduct waivers. This suggests that the conduct waiver interacts with 
ability, which is to be expected given the goals of the “whole person” policy.  
The results also suggest that a number of other factors are associated with 
lower 180-day attrition rates. In particular, it appears that males are 75% (calculate 
as below in the footnote) less likely to attrite, minorities are less likely to attrite by 
35%, 40%, and 35% (for black, Hispanic, and other race, respectively). On the other 
hand, married individuals are 9.5% more likely to attrite, individuals with dependents 
are 3.5% more likely to attrite (for each additional dependant), and older individuals 
are 3.5% more likely to attrite (for each additional year of age). It also appears that 
recruits with prior military exposure are less likely to attrite. In particular, recruits who 
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Table 9.   Probit Models of 180-Day Attrition  
(Restricted and unrestricted cohort groups).  
  
Unrestricted Sample 
Cohort Years 2000 through 2005 
Restricted Sample 
Cohort Years 2000 through 2002 
Variable             
Demographics              
Male -0.39268 -0.39653 -0.39654 -0.42286 -0.42895 -0.42876 
 (0.00745)*** (0.00749)*** (0.00749)*** (0.01028)*** (0.01035)*** (0.01035)*** 
 [-0.08659] [-0.08703] [-0.08701] [-0.09854] [-0.0992] [-0.09914] 
Black -0.1938 -0.23347 -0.23436 -0.23487 -0.2856 -0.2861 
 (0.00838)*** (0.00866)*** (0.00866)*** (0.01116)*** (0.01162)*** (0.01162)*** 
 [-0.03438] [-0.0405] [-0.04063] [-0.04388] [-0.05186] [-0.05193] 
Hispanic -0.24203 -0.27691 -0.2773 -0.37498 -0.42248 -0.42267 
 (0.00982)*** (0.01000)*** (0.01000)*** (0.01448)*** (0.01477)*** (0.01478)*** 
 [-0.04142] [-0.0463] [-0.04634] [-0.06413] [-0.06987] [-0.06989] 
Other races -0.23611 -0.25203 -0.25235 -0.23581 -0.26059 -0.26078 
 (0.01631)*** (0.01638)*** (0.01639)*** (0.02357)*** (0.02372)*** (0.02372)*** 
 [-0.0394] [-0.04136] [-0.04139] [-0.04176] [-0.04496] [-0.04498] 
Age 0.01477 0.02043 0.02078 0.02977 0.03625 0.03646 
 (0.00924) (0.00926)** (0.00926)** (0.01318)** (0.01322)*** (0.01322)*** 
 [0.00282] [0.00388] [0.00394] [0.00601] [0.00724] [0.00728] 
Age_sqr -0.00024 -0.00029 -0.00029 -0.00051 -0.00056 -0.00057 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00028)* (0.00028)** (0.00028)** 
 [-0.00004] [-0.00006] [-0.00006] [-0.0001] [-0.00011] [-0.00011] 
Married 0.0547 0.05508 0.05487 0.00005 0.00226 0.00217 
 (0.01465)*** (0.01467)*** (0.01467)*** (0.02168) (0.02174) (0.02174) 
 [0.0107] [0.01071] [0.01066] [0.00001] [0.00045] [0.00043] 
Dependents 0.0368 0.0229 0.02273 0.06093 0.042 0.04205 
 (0.00716)*** (0.00719)*** (0.00719)*** (0.01041)*** (0.01046)*** (0.01046)*** 
 [0.00703] [0.00434] [0.00431] [0.0123] [0.00839] [0.0084] 
YP -0.32529 -0.31473 -0.31521 -0.2718 -0.25817 -0.25855 
 (0.12643)** (0.12632)** (0.12631)** (0.14038)* (0.14032)* (0.14032)* 
 [-0.05054] [-0.04887] [-0.04891] [-0.04652] [-0.04404] [-0.04409] 
JROTC -0.09702 -0.08884 -0.08862 -0.10243 -0.08793 -0.08789 
 (0.01886)*** (0.01892)*** (0.01892)*** (0.02285)*** (0.02295)*** (0.02295)*** 
 [-0.01752] [-0.01601] [-0.01597] [-0.01956] [-0.01674] [-0.01673] 
Ability              
AFQT  -0.00404 -0.00404  -0.00543 -0.00543 
  (0.00017)*** (0.00017)***  (0.00025)*** (0.00025)*** 
  [-0.00077] [-0.00077]  [-0.00108] [-0.00108] 
NHSDG  0.15225 0.15168  0.21591 0.21571 
  (0.00775)*** (0.00775)***  (0.01090)*** (0.01090)*** 
  [0.03061] [0.03048]  [0.04675] [0.0467] 
Waivers              








Cohort Years 2000 through 2005 
Restricted Sample 
Cohort Years 2000 through 2002 
Variable             
Waiver (0.01217)*** (0.01221)***  (0.01734)*** (0.01744)***  
 [-0.02229] [-0.02292]  [-0.02086] [-0.02275]  
Medical 0.06899 0.07899 0.0792 0.07385 0.0855 0.0856 
Waiver (0.01334)*** (0.01338)*** (0.01338)*** (0.01990)*** (0.02001)*** (0.02001)*** 
 [0.01367] [0.01564] [0.01567] [0.0155] [0.01787] [0.01788] 
Other 0.05788 0.07143 0.071 -0.07232 -0.05242 -0.05234 
Waiver (0.02844)** (0.02850)** (0.02850)** (0.04263)* (-0.04275) (-0.04275) 
 [0.01144] [0.01413] [0.01404] [-0.01401] [-0.01016] [-0.01014] 
Drug   -0.07964   -0.07135 
Waiver   (0.02564)***   (0.03236)** 
   [-0.0144]   [-0.01368] 
Minor Traffic   0.20587   0.17533 
Waiver   (0.15478)   (0.16189) 
   [0.04404]   [0.03868] 
Serious Traffic   -0.32685   -0.20687 
Waiver   (0.04708)***   (0.10203)** 
   [-0.05045]   [-0.03645] 
Minor Non-Traffic   -0.09499   -0.19971 
Waiver   (0.0615)   (0.08054)** 
   [-0.01699]   [-0.03536] 
Serious Non-
Traffic 
  -0.11147   -0.11476 
Waiver   (0.01633)***   (0.02453)*** 
   [-0.01984]   [-0.0215] 
Felony    -0.16343   -0.17513 
Waiver   (0.02826)***   (0.03859)*** 
   [-0.02807]   [-0.03156] 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observed  
P(attrite) 
0.1164301 0.1164301 0.1164301 0.1271509 0.1271509 0.1271509
Predicted 
P(attrite) 
0.1124099 0.1113581 0.1113142 0.1216140 0.1197631 0.1197365
Observations 289444 289444 289444 141627 141627 141627
               
Notes: The sample includes observations form two different cohort year groups.  Standard errors 
appear in parentheses.   
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Table 10 presents the probit regression results for the restricted and 
unrestricted models of 365-day attrition model.  This model mirrors the 180-day 
model in the restricted and unrestricted sample sizes.  The two samples are defined 
the same way, the independent variables are the same, and the control group again 
involves those who enlist without waivers.  Again the regression results appear 
similar across the two samples, suggesting that using either sample will give us 
similar results.  In this 365-day model the observed and predicted probabilities are 
once again reported at the bottom of the table.  Both, the predicted probability and 
the observed probability of attrition are similar and correspond well with known 
historical attrition rates for the first year.  Roughly 16% of new recruits are predicted 
to undergo attrition by the end of the first year.  Just as in the 180-day attrition 
model, the 365-day model reports partial effects for all variables in square brackets.  
The moral waiver variable yields partial effects that are still negative in sign.  The 
moral waiver partial effect is now reduced to -0.018 (or 11%).  This would indicate 
that the effect of having a conduct waiver on attrition is diminishing over time.  The 
conduct waiver subgroups also report similar results, as in the 180-day model, 
including the minor traffic group.  The serious non-traffic, felony and drug conduct 
waivers make up the majority of conduct waivers and their partial effects are the 
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Table 10.    Probit Models of 365-day Attrition (Restricted and unrestricted 
cohort groups).  
  
Unrestricted Sample 
Cohort Years 2000 through 2005 
Restricted Sample  
Cohort Years 2000 through 2002 
Variable              
Demographics              
Male -0.4466 -0.45308 -0.45302  -0.46745 -0.47441 -0.47413 
 (0.00692)*** (0.00696)*** (0.00696)***  (0.00969)*** (0.00975)*** (0.00975)*** 
 [-0.12092] [-0.12235] [-0.12231]  [-0.12883] [-0.13015] [-0.13004] 
Black -0.21292 -0.24858 -0.24994  -0.24129 -0.28817 -0.28928 
 (0.00774)*** (0.00800)*** (0.00800)***  (0.01044)*** (0.01087)*** (0.01087)*** 
 [-0.04716] [-0.05412] [-0.05437]  [-0.05444] [-0.06361] [-0.06381] 
Hispanic -0.22094 -0.25254 -0.25301  -0.3352 -0.37946 -0.37965 
 (0.00889)*** (0.00907)*** (0.00907)***  (0.01316)*** (0.01344)*** (0.01345)*** 
 [-0.04816] [-0.05406] [-0.05414]  [-0.07123] [-0.07855] [-0.07856] 
Other races -0.21236 -0.22568 -0.226  -0.2022 -0.22483 -0.2251 
 (0.01473)*** (0.01479)*** (0.01480)***  (0.02163)*** (0.02177)*** (0.02177)*** 
 [-0.04547] [-0.04773] [-0.04778]  [-0.04438] [-0.04839] [-0.04843] 
Age -0.00222 0.00318 0.00345  0.00844 0.01443 0.01474 
 (0.00853) (0.00855) (0.00855)  (0.01232) (0.01236) (0.01237) 
 [-0.00053] [0.00075] [0.00082]  [0.00204] [0.00346] [0.00354] 
Age_sqr 0.0001 0.00005 0.00005  -0.00007 -0.00012 -0.00013 
 (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018)  (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026) 
 [0.00002] [0.00001] [0.00001]  [-0.00002] [-0.00003] [-0.00003] 
Married 0.04386 0.04377 0.04369  -0.01275 -0.01075 -0.01105 
 (0.01364)*** (0.01366)*** (0.01366)***  (-0.02045) (-0.02049) (-0.0205) 
 [0.01058] [0.01051] [0.01049]  [-0.00307] [-0.00257] [-0.00264] 
Dependents 0.03966 0.02494 0.02476  0.06518 0.04658 0.04673 
 (0.00668)*** (0.00671)*** (0.00671)***  (0.00983)*** (0.00987)*** (0.00987)*** 
 [0.00941] [0.00589] [0.00585]  [0.01577] [0.01118] [0.01122] 
YP -0.27043 -0.256 -0.2568  -0.26051 -0.24619 -0.24687 
 (0.10985)** (0.10969)** (0.10968)**  (0.12756)** (0.12745)* (0.12745)* 
 [-0.05549] [-0.05266] [-0.05278]  [-0.05491] [-0.05187] [-0.05198] 
JROTC -0.10811 -0.09673 -0.09646  -0.10456 -0.08962 -0.08938 
 (0.01729)*** (0.01734)*** (0.01735)***  (0.02119)*** (0.02128)*** (0.02128)*** 
 [-0.02434] [-0.02179] [-0.02172]  [-0.02408] [-0.02063] [-0.02057] 
Ability              
AFQT  -0.0038 -0.00379   -0.00508 -0.00507 
  (0.00016)*** (0.00016)***   (0.00024)*** (0.00024)*** 
  [-0.0009] [-0.0009]   [-0.00122] [-0.00122] 
NHSDG  0.17652 0.17586   0.21755 0.21739 
  (0.00716)*** (0.00716)***   (0.01029)*** (0.01029)*** 








Cohort Years 2000 through 2005 
Restricted Sample  
Cohort Years 2000 through 2002 
Variable              
Waivers              
Moral -0.07367 -0.07871   -0.06936 -0.08076  
Waiver (0.01095)*** (0.01098)***   (0.01592)*** (0.01601)***  
 [-0.01694] [-0.01796]   [-0.01628] [-0.01872]  
Medical 0.03915 0.0498 0.05012  0.04451 0.05572 0.0559 
Waiver (0.01250)*** (0.01253)*** (0.01254)***  (0.01892)** (0.01900)*** (0.01901)*** 
 [0.00946] [0.01203] [0.0121]  [0.01098] [0.01372] [0.01376] 
Other 0.03577 0.04962 0.04932  -0.08162 -0.0628 -0.0629 
Waiver (0.0268) (0.02685)* (0.02686)*  (0.04021)** (0.04033) (0.04033) 
 [0.00864] [0.01201] [0.01193]  [-0.01895] [-0.01461] [-0.01463] 
Drug   0.01056    0.00197 
Waiver   (0.02267)    (0.02933) 
   [0.00251]    [0.00047] 
Minor Traffic   0.17491    0.18605 
Waiver   (0.14618)    (0.1526) 
   [0.04498]    [0.04882] 
Serious Traffic   -0.2969    -0.34609 
Waiver   (0.04181)***    (0.10098)*** 
   [-0.05976]    [-0.06893] 
Minor Non-Traffic   -0.09686    -0.21756 
Waiver   (0.05629)*    (0.07492)*** 
   [-0.02174]    [-0.04658] 
Serious Non-Traffic   -0.06591    -0.07777 
Waiver   (0.01471)***    (0.02255)*** 
   [-0.01508]    [-0.01799] 
Felony    -0.1348    -0.14744 
Waiver   (0.02545)***    (0.03531)*** 
   [-0.0297]    [-0.03285] 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observed  P(attrite) 0.1586835 0.1586835 0.1586835  0.1643896 0.1643896 0.1643896
Predicted P(attrite) 0.1540814 0.1529086 0.1528467  0.1585642 0.1567825 0.1567216
Observations 289444 289444 289444  141627 141627 141627
               
Notes: The sample includes observations form two different cohort year groups.  Standard errors appear in parentheses.   
***significant at the 1%; ** significant at the 5%; *significant at the 10%.  Partial effects appear in square brackets.   
 
The 365-day attrition model confirms prior findings with respect to the effect of 
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that males, minorities, and higher-ability recruits are less likely to attrite. Older, 
married, and recruits with dependents are more likely to attrite, all else equal. Both 
youth programs and JROTC participants continue to display lower attrition rates, 
indicating that such programs may result in better or more stable job matches.  
Table 11 presents the results for first-term attrition.  This table shows similar 
probit results as the 180- and 365-day models and presents partial effects for each 
variable in square brackets.  There is only one set of results in Table 11 because 
first-term attrition can only be studied for the cohorts entering during 2000 through 
2002.  Again, this is due to the fact that these are the only cohorts in the sample that 
are observed for 3- or 4 years.  The observed and predicted probabilities of attrition 
also of around 32% closely match the findings in Chapter III and historically known 
attrition rates in the first term.  Interestingly, the effect of conduct waivers has turned 
around at this point and the predicted effect on attrition appears to be positive and 
significant.  The partial effect of the moral waiver is now 0.042.  This would indicate 
that an individual who enters the Army with a conduct waiver stands a 13% higher 
probability of attrition by the end of the first enlistment term.  Because first-term 
attrition rates are inclusive of earlier attrition rates (180- and 365-day attrition), this 
effect suggests that the early positive performance of recruits with conduct waivers 
is wiped out by later higher attrition rates. 
Table 11.   Probit Models of Full-Term Attrition  
  
Unrestricted Sample 
Cohort Years 2000 through 2002 
Variable       
Demographics       
Male -0.51456 -0.52364 -0.52343 
 (0.00878)*** (0.00883)*** (0.00883)*** 
 [-0.19339] [-0.19671] [-0.19661] 
Black -0.15446 -0.19193 -0.19518 
 (0.00891)*** (0.00929)*** (0.00930)*** 
 [-0.05389] [-0.06646] [-0.06754] 
Hispanic -0.26352 -0.29956 -0.30057 
 (0.01094)*** (0.01118)*** (0.01119)*** 
 [-0.08921] [-0.1004] [-0.1007] 








Cohort Years 2000 through 2002 
Variable       
 (0.01872)*** (0.01882)*** (0.01882)*** 
 [-0.0756] [-0.08099] [-0.08107] 
Age -0.02394 -0.01966 -0.01948 
 (0.01089)** (0.01092)* (0.01092)* 
 [-0.00854] [-0.007] [-0.00694] 
Age_sqr 0.00041 0.00039 0.0004 
 (0.00023)* (0.00023)* (0.00023)* 
 [0.00015] [0.00014] [0.00014] 
Married 0.00954 0.00998 0.00955 
 (0.01809) (0.01812) (0.01813) 
 [0.00341] [0.00356] [0.00341] 
Dependants 0.07432 0.05659 0.057 
 (0.00876)*** (0.00880)*** (0.00880)*** 
 [0.02651] [0.02016] [0.0203] 
YP -0.26254 -0.24917 -0.25014 
 (0.10474)** (0.10481)** (0.10485)** 
 [-0.08712] [-0.08287] [-0.08316] 
JROTC -0.10823 -0.09096 -0.09067 
 (0.01792)*** (0.01798)*** (0.01799)*** 
 [-0.03765] [-0.03172] [-0.03162] 
Ability       
AFQT  -0.00431 -0.0043 
  (0.00020)*** (0.00020)*** 
  [-0.00153] [-0.00153] 
NHSDG  0.23597 0.23622 
  (0.00915)*** (0.00916)*** 
  [0.08675] [0.08684] 
Waivers       
Moral 0.12539 0.11514  
Waiver (0.01327)*** (0.01331)***  
 [0.04578] [0.04191]  
Medical 0.01878 0.02996 0.03093 
Waiver (0.0167) (0.01675)* (0.01675)* 
 [0.00673] [0.01074] [0.01109] 
Other -0.11185 -0.09353 -0.0938 
Waiver (0.03581)*** (0.03587)*** (0.03588)*** 
 [-0.03881] [-0.03255] [-0.03264] 
Drug   0.31889 
Waiver   (0.02432)*** 
   [0.12029] 
Minor Traffic   0.21055 
Waiver   (0.13724) 








Cohort Years 2000 through 2002 
Variable       
Serious Traffic   -0.0733 
Waiver   (0.07663) 
   [-0.02563] 
Minor Non-Traffic   -0.02555 
Waiver   (0.05936) 
   [-0.00904] 
Serious Non-Traffic   0.03352 
Waiver   (0.01904)* 
   [0.01202] 
Felony    0.04006 
Waiver   (0.0286) 
   [0.0144] 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observed  P(attrite) 0.3217183 0.3217183 0.3217183
Predicted P(attrite) 0.3181328 0.316976 0.3168949
Observations 141627 141627 141627
        
Notes: The sample includes observations from two different cohort year groups.    
Standard errors appear in parentheses.  ***significant at the 1%; ** significant at the 5%; 
*significant at the 10%.  Partial effects appear in square brackets.  
  
 
From Tables 9 and 11 there is seen a noticeable change from the 180-day 
attrition model to the first-term attrition model in the sign of the moral waiver 
coefficient.  This reversal of the moral waiver sign indicates that there is a change in 
the effect that conduct waivers have on attrition over time.  Since the sign of the 
effect was the same in the 180-day and 365-day attrition, regardless of which 
sample was used (restricted or unrestricted), then the first-term effect is most likely 
the true effect of conduct waivers and not a cohort effect.  The negative sign of the 
moral waiver variable shows that up to the 1-year point, soldiers with conduct 
waivers have lower attrition than their counterparts with no waivers.  Up to this point, 
conduct waivers actually have an effect of lowering attrition.  However, this effect is 
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waivers are more likely to separate before the end of the first term than soldiers with 
no waivers.  
Table 12 summarizes the estimated coefficients of the detailed waiver 
categories on each of the three attrition variables. From these coefficients it is 
possible to identify how each type of waiver affects attrition at different points in time.  
It is also possible to determine whether particular categories of conduct waivers are 
driving the sign of the aggregated moral waiver variable.  As before, soldiers with 
conduct waivers are compared to individuals with no waivers.   
Table 12.   Probit Model of Moral Conduct Waiver Category Attrition 
    Attrition Measurement 
Variable 180 day 1 year Full Term 
Waivers       
Drug -0.07964 0.01056 0.31889 
Waiver (0.02564)*** (0.02267) (0.02432)*** 
 [-0.0144] [0.00251] [0.12029] 
Minor Traffic 0.20587 0.17491 0.21055 
Waiver (0.15478) (0.14618) (0.13724) 
 [0.04404] [0.04498] [0.07828] 
Serious Traffic -0.32685 -0.2969 -0.0733 
Waiver (0.04708)*** (0.04181)*** (0.07663) 
 [-0.05045] [-0.05976] [-0.02563] 
Minor Non-Traffic -0.09499 -0.09686 -0.02555 
Waiver (0.0615) (0.05629)* (0.05936) 
 [-0.01699] [-0.02174] [-0.00904] 
Serious Non-Traffic -0.11147 -0.06591 0.03352 
Waiver (0.01633)*** (0.01471)*** (0.01904)* 
 [-0.01984] [-0.01508] [0.01202] 
Felony  -0.16343 -0.1348 0.04006 
Waiver (0.02826)*** (0.02545)*** (0.0286) 
 [-0.02807] [-0.0297] [0.0144] 
    
Observed P(attrite) 0.1164301 0.1586835 0.3217183
Predicted P(attrite) 0.1113142 0.1528467 0.3168949
Observations 289444 289444 141627
        
Notes: The sample contains full numbers of observations possible from each attrition measurement.   
Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Partial effects appear in square brackets. 
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The Serious Traffic and Minor Non-Traffic conduct waivers both have 
negative signs at each of the attrition points and are significant in the early attrition 
models.  This indicates that these types of waivers are contributing to a predicted 
lower attrition rate, especially in early attrition.  These violations account for 9.3% of 
all conduct waivers (Table 4).  This would indicate that these types of offenses 
should be considered more forgivable by waiver administrators and continued to be 
allowed admission to the Army. The evidence in this study indicates that the “whole 
person” policy is working for these particular waiver codes. 
Serious Non-Traffic and Felony waivers make up 75% of all conduct waivers.  
According to AR 601-210, these waivers are assigned for, but not limited to, such 
offenses as aggravated assault, breaking and entering, carjacking and manslaughter 
(Department of the Army, 2005, May 16, p. 35).  These waivers are responsible for 
the reversal of sign seen in the different attrition variables from Tables 12.  They are 
the largest group and seem to be the driving force behind the general conduct 
waiver attrition effects.  The first-year attrition effects are negative in sign and 
significant.  This would indicate that early on, soldiers with these waivers are 
experiencing lower attrition.  However, for first-term attrition they reverse sign and 
lose some significance.  This shows that they experience higher attrition at that 
point. 
Out of all categories of waivers, the drug waiver appears to have the 
strongest (positive) effect on attrition at the end of the first term. Recruits who come 
in with a drug waiver are 38% more likely to attrite before serving their first term. In 
the first 180 days they are about 12% less likely to attrite, whereas at 365 days their 
attrition rates are no different than those of recruits who come in with no waivers. It 
could be that the higher attrition rates of recruits with drug waivers are driven by the 
possibility of re-offending while in service. Because the Army has adopted a zero-
tolerance policy and conducts random drug tests periodically, re-offending soldiers 
with drug waivers may be more likely to get caught and separated as a result. It 
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characteristics that make them more likely to use drugs and more likely to attrite. 
These explanations will be considered in more detail in Section C below. 
B. Analysis of Interactions between Moral Waivers and 
Model Variables 
“Sometimes, it is natural for the partial effect, elasticity, or semi-elasticity of 
the dependent variable with respect to an explanatory variable to depend on the 
magnitude of yet another explanatory variable” (Wooldridge, 2006, p.204). In this 
section I investigate whether conduct waivers interact with several background 
characteristics. Interaction effects between model variables and conduct waivers are 
estimated using linear probability models with robust standard errors.  Of the control 
variables, the following five were found to be significantly interacting with the 
presence of a moral conduct waiver.  The estimates of these regression results are 
presented in Table 13.   
Table 13.   Effects of Significant Model Variables Interacted with Moral Conduct 
Waivers. 
Variables Interacted   Attrition Measurement   
Black & Moral Waiver   180 day 1 year Full Term 
Black * Moral  0.0239 0.0332 0.0983 
  (.0057)*** (.0067)*** (.0134)*** 
Blacks: Moral vs. Non-Moral  -0.0010 0.0126 0.1253 
  (0.0053) (.0062)** (.0124)*** 
Moral Waivers: Black vs. Non-Black  -0.0255 -0.0302 0.0224 
    (.0055)*** (.0065)*** (.0130)* 
          
Hispanic & Moral Waiver   180 day 1 year Full Term 
Hispanic * Moral  0.0172 0.0159 0.0356 
  (.0061)*** (.0074)** (.0154)*** 
Hispanics: Moral vs. Non-Moral  -0.0021 0.0033 0.0810 
  (0.0058) (0.0070) (.0146)*** 
Moral Waivers: Hispanics vs. Non-
Hispanics 
 -0.0311 -0.0380 -0.0619 
    (.0059)*** (.0071)*** (.0151)*** 
          
Medical Waiver & Moral Waiver   180 day 1 year Full Term 
Medical * Moral  -0.0231 -0.0177 -0.0165 
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Variables Interacted   Attrition Measurement   
Medical Waivers: Moral vs. Non-Moral  -0.0427 -0.0318 0.0297 
  (.0090)*** (.0107)*** (0.0247) 
Moral Waivers: Medical vs. Non-Medical  -0.0058 -0.0053 -0.0027 
    (0.0087) (0.0105) (0.0244) 
          
NHSDG & Moral Waiver   180 day 1 year Full Term 
NHSDG * Moral  -0.0108 -0.0112 -0.0494 
  (.0051)** (.0061)* (.0114)*** 
NHSDG: Moral vs. Non-Moral  -0.0300 -0.0248 0.0051 
  (.0047)*** (.0054)*** (0.0101) 
Moral Waivers: NHSDG vs. HSDG  0.0212 0.0335 0.0057 
    (.0049)*** (.0057)*** (.0109)*** 
          
AFQT & Moral Waiver   180 day 1 year Full Term 
AFQT * Moral  0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 
  (0.0001) (.0001)* 0.0003 
          
Notes: All interaction effects are estimated via linear probability models with robust standard errors in 
parentheses (robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation). The differences in outcomes 
between recruits with moral conduct waivers and those without, and variable participants are obtained 
by including separate categories for each variable-moral waiver combination in linear probability 
models, and leaving out the appropriate control group. All models include controls for demographics, 
ability, cohort year and other types of waivers. Interaction of moral waivers with other race categories 
and explanatory variables did not yield any significant results.  
***significant at the 1%; **significant at the 5%; *significant at the 10%. 
1. Interaction of Black and Conduct Waivers 
The variables indicating black or Hispanic race revealed a more complex 
relationship with conduct waivers than the stand alone race dummy variables.  
Interacting the black dummy variable with the conduct waiver produced a positive 
coefficient, across all three measures of attrition, thus indicating that being black with 
conduct waivers for enlistment increases the probability of attrition.  This same 
regression showed that this interaction was significant.  The second regression 
answers a question: Among blacks, are those with conduct waivers at an increased 
risk of attrition over those without conduct waivers?  The effect begins as not 
significant in affecting attrition, but it worsens 365-day and first-term attrition.  This 
suggests that initially blacks with conduct waivers should have better attrition in the 
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find differences between blacks and non-blacks.  The next question I pose is: among 
those with conduct waivers, are blacks at a lower risk of attrition than non-blacks?  
The regression indicates that this is true (and significantly so) for at least the first 
year.  By the end of the first term this effect changes sign and begins to lose its 
significance.  This reveals that in this sample blacks with conduct waivers succumb 
to attrition less often, at least in the first year, than non-blacks with conduct waivers. 
2. Interaction of Hispanic and Conduct Waivers 
The most interesting regression result for Hispanics revealed that, among 
those with conduct waivers, Hispanics are at a significantly lower risk of attrition than 
non-Hispanics. This result holds true across all three indicators of attrition.  This is 
revealing in that in this sample Hispanics with conduct waivers do attrite less than 
non-Hispanics with conduct waivers.  This racial/ethnic group has seen a large 
increase in recent years, not only in absolute numbers but also as a percentage of 
the new recruit population. 
3. Interaction of Medical Waivers and Conduct Waivers 
The next question I pose involves the potential interaction of waivers across 
different categories. Interactions between conduct and medical waivers proved to 
only be slightly significant in the 180-day and 365-day attrition measurements.  This 
result sheds light on the question of whether, among those with medical waivers, 
those who also needed a conduct waiver for enlistment had a higher probability of 
attrition.  For both 180-day and 365-day attrition this seems to be true.  The negative 
sign of the coefficients indicate that individuals with both types of waivers should be 
expected to have better attrition rates than someone with a medical waiver alone.  
This may be mostly due to the high amount of dedication it takes to gain entrance 
under both such conditions.  This could also reflect a carry-over effect from the 
conduct waivers themselves and have less to do with the medical waiver status.  
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4. Interaction of Non-High School Diploma Graduates and Conduct 
Waivers 
Being a NHSDG, or not having a traditional high school diploma, and entering 
the Army with a conduct waiver proved to have a negative coefficient for all three 
attrition measurements.  This indicates that being in both groups decreases your 
chances of attrition.  This is contrary to rational thinking, since both categories are 
considered less than optimal for a new recruit.   Looking deeper into the interaction, 
the NHSDG variable was allowed to depend on conduct waiver status.  In the early 
attrition models non-grads with conduct waivers have a significantly lower probability 
of attrition compared to non-grads with no waivers.  But, by the end of the first term, 
this difference becomes insignificant.  Of those who possessed a conduct waiver, 
NHSDG’s consistently had higher attrition probabilities than traditional high school 
graduates, and these effects were significant throughout.   
5. Interaction of AFQT and Conduct Waivers 
The interactions between AFQT and conduct waivers all proved insignificant.  
This was not expected because it was hypothesized that the reason individuals with 
conduct waivers possessed higher AFQT scores was because they needed those 
higher scores to mitigate the fact that they needed a conduct waiver to be granted 
entrance into the Army.  Using the “whole person” concept was expected to make 
these two terms much more related. 
C. Connecting Conduct Waivers with Attrition Reasons 
Earlier, it was observed that soldiers enlisting with a drug waiver were far 
more likely to separate before completing their first term, compared to other recruits 
with different kinds of conduct waivers. Two hypotheses were presented: (1) those 
with drug-waivers may be more likely to re-offend and separate due to this, or (2) 
those with drug waivers may be inherently different in non-observable 
characteristics, which make them more likely to use drugs and attrite before the end 
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numbers of soldiers who entered the Army with a conduct waiver for drugs or 
alcohol.  This number is compared with the numbers of soldiers who received a 
discharge that was issued for a drug- or alcohol-related reason.  Out of the entire 
sample of recruits who were discharged for alcoholism or drugs, 6.84% had enlisted 
with a drug waiver.  This small number suggests that there may be little connection 
between the type of conduct waiver a soldier receives upon entrance and the reason 
why he/she attrites.  This evidence grants more credibility to the second hypothesis 
above, namely that other intrinsic characteristics of certain soldiers make them more 
likely to both abuse drugs and alcohol and also attrite before completing their 
obligation. 
Table 14.   Substance Abuse Waivers and Substance Abuse Attrition. 
Total Attrition Substance Attrition % of total 
128315 8567 6.68%
     
Substance Attrition Substance waiver and Substance Attrition  % of total 
8567 586 6.84%
     
Total Attrition Substance waiver and Substance Attrition  % of total 
128315 586 0.46%
To further investigate these issues, I estimate multivariate models of 
substance attrition as a function of all observed control variables and the conduct 
waiver categories. The new dependent variable—Substance Attrition—takes a value 
of 1 if a soldier  separates with a discharge coded as Alcoholism or Drugs, and set = 
0 otherwise.  Table 15 displays the results of the probit regression model along with 
the partial effects in square brackets.  The results suggest that recruits who come in 
with a drug waiver are twice as likely to attrite for substance use than non-waiver 
recruits.  While the marginal effect is large, the absolute magnitude is relatively 
small, since only 6.68% of all attrition discharges were for drug/alcohol problems.  Of 
all the conduct waiver subgroups drug/alcohol waivers had the largest effect on 
predicting a substance type attrition loss.  Soldiers with drug waivers had a 200% 
higher probability of undergoing substance attrition than comparable individuals with 
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may indicate that recruits enlisting with other types of conduct waivers are more 
likely to offend and not necessarily for the same reasons that they received their 
initial conduct waiver.  These higher probabilities aid the argument that recruits with 
waivers may possess prior behavioral problems.  These behavior problems result in 
a conduct waiver for enlistment and those same soldiers engaging in morally 
questionable behavior later on.   
Table 15.   Probit Analysis of Abuse Waivers and Substance Abuse Attrition. 




Minor Traffic -0.09249 
Waiver (0.33401) 
 [-0.00968] 
Serious Traffic 0.40033 
Waiver (0.07171)*** 
 [0.06102] 
Minor Non-Traffic 0.10207 
Waiver (0.10274) 
 [0.01246] 
Serious Non-Traffic 0.40259 
Waiver (0.02425)*** 
 [0.06008] 









Observed P(attrite)  0.0672753
Predicted P(attrite) 0.0559317
Observations 105269
Notes: Model includes controls for demographics, ability, and cohort years.  Standard errors appear 
in parentheses.  Partial effects appear in square brackets. 
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Although these numbers reflect what is known about each individual, there 
are potential problems with the ability to accurately reflect the true relationship 
between these two variables.  These inaccuracies rise from problems of reporting at 
both recruitment and discharge.  First, the severity of the drug or alcohol offenses 
that generated the conduct waiver is not disclosed.  Minor substance offenses are 
lumped in with true problems with addiction. Also, some offenses like driving under 
the influence are recorded as traffic waivers and may result in measurement error. 
On the tail end is the discharge code.  It is possible that some soldiers who commit 
drug and alcohol offenses and are discharged may not be given an Alcoholism or 
Drugs separation code.  These soldiers can receive misconduct or other types of 
discharges.  The classification of each discharge is determined by the command 
involved with the soldier and highly subject to the circumstances of the infraction.  
These problems obscure the relationships between conduct waivers and types of 
discharges.  The magnitude of both the waiver classification, and more critically, the 
nature of discharge problems are not known. So at this time, with the data available, 
there can not be a true causal relationship determined between the type of conduct 
waiver and the type of attrition discharge. 
D. Survival Analysis Results 
The regression results discussed earlier indicate that attrition rates of recruits 
with moral conduct waivers depend crucially on the time at which attrition is 
measured. To provide a more complete picture of attrition rates over time, I 
conducted a survival analysis of attrition. Survival analysis models the time to event 
data; in this context, attrition is considered to be the event of interest. The survival 
analysis model also assumes that attrition occurs just once for each subject in the 
sample.  This event modeling could be considered as the rate or time to which new 
enlisted soldiers progress or attrite in their first contract.  In this case, the “event” of 
interest would be the soldier not completing the first term under circumstances 
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Survival analysis in this study will answer questions such as: what is the 
percentage of the population that will survive past entry to the Army? Of those that 
survive, at what rate will they attrite? Do soldiers who enlist with a conduct waiver 
have higher or lower odds of survival, and how do these odds vary over the life of 
the first contract?  Does the failure or attrition rate remain constant and how do 
those rates compare with soldiers who have no waivers? 
Figure 2 is the graphical depiction of the survival analysis for the lifespan of 
the soldiers in the sample population.  This table shows the percentage of soldiers 
remaining as time progresses through the first contract.  This percentage is 
calculated by the number of soldiers lost to attrition over the total number of soldiers 
in the sample.  Both conduct waivered and non-waivered groups are displayed by 
separate trace lines on the graph.  Conduct waiver recruits are represented in red 
and non-waivered recruits are shown in blue.  Both lines show soldiers dropping out 
of the sample, due to attrition, over time.  These lines represent the attrition 
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Figure 2.   Survival Analysis of Moral Conduct Waiver and Non-Moral Conduct 
Waivered Recruits. 
Looking at the two lines two major trends can be identified.  First there is a 
distinct difference in the attrition percentages up to and at the 1-year point.  At the 1-
year point, slightly less conduct waiver recruits had undergone attrition compared to 
non-conduct waivered recruits.  This difference shows that at the 1-year point 
soldiers with conduct waivers have been actually performing better during the years 
studied than their non-waivered counterparts.  This would indicate that conduct 
waivers actually predict better odds of completing the first year of enlistment.  This 
effect may be from conduct waiver recruits possessing characteristics that help them 
endure the rigors of initial training and change in lifestyle.  Under the close 
supervision of the first year of military service, conduct waivered soldiers tend to be 
well suited for military life.  Understanding this phenomenon and capitalizing on the 
reasons of success could lead to large scale savings that replacing those soldiers 
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The second trend noticed in the Figure 2 is that over the lifespan, or full term 
of contract, soldiers without conduct waivers reverse the early attrition behavior and 
begin to attrite at a rate that soon out paces the conduct waivered soldiers.  This 
reversal is also seen as a change in sign of the conduct waiver variable in the 
coefficient in the different regression analysis of this study.  At the end of the 3- and 
4-year marks conduct waiver attrition has risen to pass non-conduct waiver attrition 
by roughly 4%.  Table 5 gives specific information for each year groups individual 
differences in attrition percentages for the 180 day, 365 day, and contract complete 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
A. Summary and Conclusions 
It was hypothesized in this study that historical attrition rates and models for 
individuals with conduct waivers no longer fit what is happening with soldiers who 
entered the Army with a conduct waiver in the GWOT era.  It was found that the 
difference in attrition rates between those with conduct waivers and those without 
currently stands at around 4 percentage points (or 12.5%) for soldiers in their first 
term of enlistment.  This difference is dwarfed by previous studies that stated much 
larger percentage differences (Flyer 1996, Frabutt 1996, and Connor 1997).  This 
much lower figure is in contrast to recent public opinion that objects to the increased 
use of conduct waivers.  The analysis showed that soldiers with conduct waivers 
actually have lower early attrition; for example, 180-day attrition was 2 percentage 
points lower (a 20% difference) and 365-day attrition was 2 percentage points lower 
(a 11% difference) for those with a conduct waiver. 
Probit model analysis was used to determine the predicted probability of 
attrition at the 180-day, 365-day and at the end of the first term.  This model included 
variables that have in the past been proven to be predictors of attrition and that 
make sense in the current climate.  These models allowed for the determination of 
predicted probabilities of attrition.  These probabilities reinforced the same trend of 
conduct waiver soldiers having lower attrition up through the 365-day point and then 
experiencing slightly worse attrition rates through the end of the first term of 
enlistment. 
Conduct waivers were next broken down into six sub-categories and the 
same probit regression models were run using these variables in place of the more 
general conduct waiver variable.  The Serious Traffic and Minor Non-Traffic conduct 
waivers both showed consistent results of improving attrition for early and late 
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waiver sub-group and are the driving force behind the overall conduct waiver attrition 
effects.  These two sub groups both experience lower attrition than the non-conduct 
waiver group in the short run and then their attrition rates fall below the non-
waivered group sometime after the 1-year point. 
There is little correlation between conduct waivers and the reasons for 
attrition.  The probit analysis indicated a 12.6% higher probability of substance 
attrition for those who came in under a substance type conduct waiver, than those 
with no waivers.  With the available data it is not possible to understand the true 
relationship between the types of conduct waivers issued and the nature of the 
attrition discharge a soldier receives.  Problems with both conduct waiver coding and 
categorization of discharges are believed to exist and make determinations of the 
correlation between waivers and reasons for attrition difficult to accurately measure. 
Survival analysis results mirror those found in the probit multivariate models.  
The attrition rates of conduct waivered soldiers are slightly better than those without 
conduct waivers through the first year of service.  Soon after the first year these 
rates fall off and are soon below that of non-waivered soldiers.  By the end of the 
first contract the same 4 percentage point difference in attrition rates is noticed.  The 
survival analysis gives a graphical view of what is happening in terms of attrition 
over the lifespan of the initial contract. 
B. Recommendations 
1. General  
The increase in the number of conduct waivers noticed over the years studied 
in this thesis should not be as troubling, as indicated by the media and some policy 
makers.  This increase in the raw number of conduct waivers has been shown in this 
study to be at least partly due to an increase in overall recruitment numbers.  The 
use of conduct waivers was shown to be mitigated by such factors as higher AFQT 
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Finding out why soldiers short of their first year of service have better attrition 
rates could be key to aiding in the retention of these type soldiers and to reducing 
the costs of attrition.  There seems to be some time effect that these first-term 
soldiers are experiencing in their lives that changes their chances of attrition.  It is 
recommended that future studies focus on identifying reasons why these soldiers 
attrite and if measures can be instituted to mitigate early losses.  Improvements in 
matching types of conduct waivers to true reasons for attrition discharges would help 
provide these answers. 
2. Moral Conduct Waiver Visibility  
As seen in Chapter IV with both the regression results, as well as with the 
survival analysis, once conduct waivered soldiers pass the 1-year point their attrition 
rates begin to worsen and quickly surpass those of their non-waivered counterparts.  
I believe this is happening because the soldiers are slowly being released from the 
controlled environment of basic training and specialty training.  As soldiers are 
granted more responsibility for their own actions, and no longer are under the 
watchful eye of the drill instructors, they seem to have the maneuverability to allow 
their past morally questionable lifestyles to once again affect their decision making.  
This in turn allows them to make errors of judgment that causes their attrition.  I 
suggest assigning these soldiers some sort of first-term marker.  This indicator 
would give leaders better visibility and garner an extra amount of attention and 
supervision to help ensure conduct waiver soldiers complete their first term.  This 
conduct tag would allow leaders to have a better understanding of which soldiers 
need to be monitored somewhat more closely.  This tag could be used in creating 
barracks room assignments and assignment of battle buddies.  This may also carry 
an added benefit of decreasing overall attrition rates by aiding conduct waiver 
soldiers from including additional soldiers’ in future morally questionable activities 
that might cause their attrition.  This tag or marker would have to be designed in 
such a way as to ensure it did not draw a negative connotation to the soldier but 
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Appendix A. Interservice Separation Codes and 
Attrition Determination 
Sep Code Description Determined to be attrition 
1000 Unknown or not applicable Yes 
1001 Expiration of term of service No 
1002 Early release, insufficient retainability Yes 
1003 Early release, to attend school No 
1005 Early release, in the national interest No 
1008 Early release, other, including RIF, VSI, and SSB No 
1010 Condition existing prior to service Yes 
1011 Disability, severance pay Yes 
1012 Permanent disability retirement Yes 
1013 Temporary disability retirement Yes 
1014 Disability, no condtn existing prior to srvce, no sev pay Yes 
1016 Unqualified for active duty, other Yes 
1017 Failure to meet weight or body fat standards Yes 
1022 Dependency or hardship Yes 
1030 Death, battle casualty No 
1031 Death, non-battle, disease No 
1032 Death, non-battle, other No 
1050 Retirement, 20 to 30 years of service No 
1052 Retirement, other No 
1060 Character or behavior disorder Yes 
1064 Alcoholism Yes 
1065 Discreditable incidents, civilian or military Yes 
1067 Drugs Yes 
1071 Civil court conviction Yes 
1072 Security Yes 
1073 Court-martial Yes 
1074 Fraudulent entry Yes 
1075 AWOL or desertion Yes 
1076 Homosexuality Yes 
1077 Sexual perversion Yes 
1078 Good of the service (discharge in lieu of court-martial) Yes 
1080 Misconduct, reason unknown Yes 
1082 Unsuitability, reason unknown Yes 
1083 Pattern of minor disciplinary infractions Yes 
1084 Commission of a serious offense Yes 
1085 Failure to meet minimum qualifications for retention Yes 
1086 Unsatisfactory performance  Yes 
1087 Entry level performance and conduct  Yes 
1090 Secretarial authority Yes 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v - 66 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Sep Code Description Determined to be attrition 
1092 Sole surviving family member Yes 
1094 Pregnancy Yes 
1095 Minority (underage) Yes 
1096 Conscientious objector Yes 
1097 Parenthood Yes 
1098 Breach of contract Yes 
1099 Other Yes 
1100 Immediate re-enlistment No 
1101 Dropped from strength, desertion Yes 
1102 Dropped from strength, imprisonment Yes 
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Appendix  B. Enlistment Waiver Codes 
CODE DESCRIPTION WAIVER TYPE
AYA AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
AYB AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. Other Waiver 
AYC AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS COMMAND 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
AYD AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE 
CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
AYE AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY 
DISTRICT, US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL, OR US MARINE 
CORPS RECRUITING STATION. Other Waiver 
AYF AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD RECRUITING 
CENTER. Other Waiver 
BAA DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY 
THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
BAB DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY 
THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
BAC DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY 
THE US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
BAD DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY 
THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY 
AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
BAE DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY 
THE US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US AIR FORCE 
SQUADRON LEVEL, OR US MARINE CORPS RECRUITING 
STATION. Other Waiver 
BAF DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY 
THE US COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. 
Other Waiver 
BBA DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
BBB DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
BBC DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND 
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CODE DESCRIPTION WAIVER TYPE
BBD DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS 
DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
BBE DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US 
AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL, OR US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION. Other Waiver 
BBF DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. 
Other Waiver 
CYA MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING 
REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. Medical Waiver 
CYB MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING 
REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. Medical Waiver 
CYC MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING 
REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. Medical Waiver 
CYD MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING 
REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY 
AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Medical Waiver 
CYE MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING 
REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE  SQUADRON LEVEL. Medical Waiver 
CYF MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING 
REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. Medical Waiver 
DAA LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY 
LEVEL. MT Moral Waiver 
DAB LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. MT Moral Waiver 
DAC LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS 
REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. MT Moral Waiver 
DAD LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US 
MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA OR US AIR FORCE 
GROUP LEVEL. MT Moral Waiver 
DAE LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, 
US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, 
OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. MT Moral Waiver 
DAF LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD 
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CODE DESCRIPTION WAIVER TYPE
DBA LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY 
LEVEL. ST Moral Waiver 
DBB LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. ST Moral Waiver 
DBC LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS 
REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. ST Moral Waiver 
DBD LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US 
MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE 
GROUP LEVEL. ST Moral Waiver 
DBE LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, 
US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, 
OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. ST Moral Waiver 
DBF LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY US COAST GUARD 
RECRUITING CENTER. ST Moral Waiver 
DCA LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY 
LEVEL. MNT Moral Waiver
DCB LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. MNT Moral Waiver
DCC LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS 
REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. MNT Moral Waiver
DCD LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US 
MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE 
GROUP LEVEL. MNT Moral Waiver
DCE LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, 
US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, 
OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. MNT Moral Waiver
DCF LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD 
RECRUITING CENTER. MNT Moral Waiver
DDA LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY 
LEVEL.  SNT Moral Waiver
DDB LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. SNT Moral Waiver
DDC LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS 
REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. SNT Moral Waiver
DDD LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC 
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CODE DESCRIPTION WAIVER TYPE
MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE 
GROUP LEVEL. 
DDE LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, 
US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, 
OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. SNT Moral Waiver
DDF LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC 
OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD 
RECRUITING CENTER. SNT Moral Waiver
DEA LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN 
ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
FEL Moral Waiver 
DEB LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN 
ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. FEL Moral Waiver 
DEC LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN 
ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL 
COMMAND LEVEL. FEL Moral Waiver 
DED LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN 
ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US 
MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE 
GROUP LEVEL. FEL Moral Waiver 
DEE LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN 
ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, US 
NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR 
US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. FEL Moral Waiver 
DEF LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN 
ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD 
RECRUITING CENTER. FEL Moral Waiver 
DFA LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A 
JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY 
LEVEL. FEL Moral Waiver 
DFB LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A 
JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. FEL Moral Waiver 
DFC LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A 
JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS 
REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. FEL Moral Waiver 
DFD LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A 
JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US 
MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE 
GROUP LEVEL. FEL Moral Waiver 
DFE LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A 
JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, US 
NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR 
US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. FEL Moral Waiver 
DFF LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A 
JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD 
RECRUITING CENTER. FEL Moral Waiver 
EAA PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
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CODE DESCRIPTION WAIVER TYPE
ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST 
AUTHORITY LEVEL.  
EAB PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT 
ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING 
COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL Other Waiver 
EAC PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT 
ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE 
CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EAD PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT 
ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY 
BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US 
AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EAE PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT 
ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US  ARMY 
BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EAF PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT 
ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US 
SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. Other Waiver 
EBA PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EBB PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EBC PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EBD PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS 
DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EBE PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US 
MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE 
SQUADRON LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EBF PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. Other Waiver 
ECA PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER 
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ECB PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
ECC PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
ECD PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS 
DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
ECE PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US 
MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE 
SQUADRON LEVEL. Other Waiver 
ECF PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER 
GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. Other Waiver 
EDA PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT 
EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EDB PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT 
EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EDC PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT 
EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US 
MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EDD PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT 
EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US 
ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, 
OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EDE PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT 
EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US 
ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EDF PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT 
EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US 
COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. Other Waiver 
EEA PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EEB PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT 
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HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. 
EEC PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL 
COMMAND LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EED PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE 
CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EEE PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY 
DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR 
FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. Other Waiver 
EEF PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD RECRUITING 
CENTER. Other Waiver 
FAA DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST 
AUTHORITY LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FAB DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING 
COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FAC DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS 
REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FAD DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, 
US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE 
GROUP LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FAE DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY 
BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FAF DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD 
RECRUITING CENTER. DRUG Moral Waiver
FBA DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST 
AUTHORITY LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FBB DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING 
COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FBC DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE 
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FBD DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY 
BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US 
AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FBE DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY 
BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FBF DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST 
GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. DRUG Moral Waiver
FCA DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST 
AUTHORITY LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FCB DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING 
COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FCC DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE 
CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FCD DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY 
BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US 
AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FCE DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY 
BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FCF DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST 
GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. DRUG Moral Waiver
FDA DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FDB DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FDC DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FDD DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY 
AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FDE DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. DRUG Moral Waiver
FDF DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
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HAA MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER BY THE HIGHEST 
AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
MED Waiver 
HAB MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. 
MED Waiver 
HAC MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. 
MED Waiver 
HAD MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY 
AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. MED Waiver 
HAE MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. MED Waiver 
HAF MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. 
MED Waiver 
HBA MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
MED Waiver 
HBB MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. 
MED Waiver 
HBC MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. 
MED Waiver 
HBD MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY 
AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. MED Waiver 
HBE MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. MED Waiver 
HBF MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. 
MED Waiver 
HCA MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
MED Waiver 
HCB MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. MED Waiver 
HCC MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL 
COMMAND LEVEL. MED Waiver 
HCD MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE 
CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP 
LEVEL. MED Waiver 
HCE MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY 
DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR 
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HCF MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) 
WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD RECRUITING 
CENTER. MED Waiver 
JYA SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
JYB SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
JYC SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
JYD SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY 
AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
JYE SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. Other Waiver 
JYF SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. 
Other Waiver 
KYA MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
KYB MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
KYC MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
KYD MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY 
AREA, OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
KYE MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. Other Waiver 
KYF MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
US COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. 
Other Waiver 
LYA ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE 
INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
(ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, 
BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH 
A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
LYB ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE 
INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
(ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, 
BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH 
A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. Other Waiver 
LYC ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE 
INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
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BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH 
A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE CORPS 
REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. 
LYD ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE 
INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
(ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, 
BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH 
A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BRIGADE, US 
MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US AIR FORCE 
GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
LYE ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE 
INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
(ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, 
BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH 
A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY BATTALION, US 
NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR 
US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. Other Waiver 
LYF ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE 
INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
(ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, 
BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH 
A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST GUARD 
RECRUITING CENTER. Other Waiver 
MYA REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE 
(INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A 
LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST 
AUTHORITY LEVEL. Other Waiver 
MYB REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE 
(INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A 
LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING 
COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. Other Waiver 
MYC REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE 
(INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A 
LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US MARINE 
CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. Other Waiver 
MYD REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE 
(INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A 
LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY 
BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, OR US 
AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
MYE REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE 
(INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A 
LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US ARMY 
BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. Other Waiver 
MYF REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE 
(INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A 
LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US COAST 
GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. Other Waiver 
NYA CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
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NYB CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE 
RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
NYC CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US 
MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
NYD CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US 
ARMY BRIGADE, US MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, US NAVY AREA, 
OR US AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
NYE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US 
ARMY BATTALION, US NAVY DISTRICT, US MARINE CORPS 
RECRUITING STATION, OR US AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL. Other Waiver 
NYF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE US 
COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER. 
Other Waiver 
PYA ARMY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE 
WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
PYB ARMY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE 
WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE RECRUITING 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. Other Waiver 
PYD ARMY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE 
WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE ARMY BRIGADE LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
PYE ARMY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE 
WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE ARMY BATTALION LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
QYA AIR FORCE SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE 
UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST 
AUTHORITY LEVEL. Other Waiver 
QYB AIR FORCE SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE 
UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. Other Waiver 
QYD AIR FORCE SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE 
UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED BY THE US AIR FORCE 
GROUP LEVEL. Other Waiver 
QYE AIR FORCE SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE 
UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED BY THE USAF SQUADRON 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
RYA NAVY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE 
WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
RYB NAVY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE 
WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE RECRUITING 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. Other Waiver 
RYD NAVY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE 
WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE NAVY AREA LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
RYE NAVY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE 
WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE NAVY DISTRICT LEVEL. 
Other Waiver 
SYA US COAST GUARD SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—
SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE 
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XYA MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE 
UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE HIGHEST 
AUTHORITY LEVEL. Other Waiver 
XYB MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE 
UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE RECRUITING 
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. Other Waiver 
XYC MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE 
UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE REGIONAL 
COMMAND (USMC ONLY) LEVEL. Other Waiver 
XYD MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE 
UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE USMC DISTRICT 
LEVEL. Other Waiver 
XYE MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE 
UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE USMC RECRUITING 
STATION LEVEL. Other Waiver 
XXB MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—USMC 
MEDICAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM (MREP) GRANTED AT THE 
RECRUITING HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. Other Waiver 
XXE MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—USMC 
MEDICAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM (MREP) GRANTED AT THE 
USMC RECRUITING STATION LEVEL. Other Waiver 
YYY NO CONDITION CURRENTLY EXISTS REQUIRING A WAIVER; 
HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE ADMINISTRATIVE CONDITIONS THAT 
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